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 Abstract 
Barbara Kemper: Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts. The Contribution of 
Track-Two Mediation Activities to Prevent Violence in the Aceh Conflict. 
With a Foreword by Prof. Ian Macduff. Duisburg: Institute for Development 
and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 88/2007). 
Mediation and its possible contribution to the resolution of intrastate conflicts 
has gained increasing attention in today’s international arena. Especially the 
advantages of nongovernmental personnel to act as mediators (track-two me-
diation) even on the highest political level in contrast to official state representa-
tives, or state-like authorities appear worth being identified. Successful past 
mediation initiatives by such actors have already presented their obvious po-
tential in this regard. 
Following this assumption, this study analyses the question under which 
conditions mediation activities of nongovernmental actors – especially in rela-
tion to the question of the importance of a mediator’s kind and degree of lever-
age - can contribute to the prevention of violence in such conflicts? 
The report presents a theory-testing qualitative comparative case study of 
two mediation processes both of success and failure that have been conducted 
by nongovernmental actors in Aceh. Twelve hypotheses encompassing condi-
tions identified as important for mediation success in intrastate conflicts have 
been tested on both cases in order to identify those factors, which apparently 
have been most crucial for the positive outcome of the successful mediation. 
These factors are related to the conflict, the conflicting parties as well as to the 
person of the mediator and present themselves as strongly contingent and in-
terdependent in their impact on a mediation outcome. 
In particular, the empirical results of the analysis point out the importance 
of the question of leverage a nongovernmental mediator apparently needs to 
have on hand for a mediation to be successful. Given the necessary support 
official authorities can provide in cases when nongovernmental personnel ap-
pears to be the better suited mediator, this study emphasizes the need for a 
further constructive development of the communication and cooperation be-
tween international actors and interveners to a conflict on all levels of society. 
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Foreword 
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
T.S. Eliot, “Little Gidding” (No. 4 of “Four Quartets”) 
 
The last thirty years have seen a significant growth in the use and recognition of 
mediation, in both the domestic and international spheres. Mediation is hardly 
new: it is one of the oldest and most enduring forms of resolving conflicts in 
many non-Western societies. Its “translation” to and reception in Western legal 
and political systems has, however, been marked by two important develop-
ments at least. The first is that mediation, having been introduced in Western 
legal systems as an “alternative” to adjudication, as a means of overcoming 
some of the perceived deficits of formal and institutionalised procedures, has 
made the transition to now being recognised as a mainstream process. Indeed, 
in European, American and other jurisdictions, mediation is increasingly asso-
ciated with the courts, by way of pre-trial processes, court-linked mediation, 
judge-led mediation, or some other hybrid that affirms the links between the 
institutional structures of law and the discursive, participatory process of me-
diation. 
The second key development is that, during this transition from the mar-
ginal to mainstream, mediation has been the subject of intense practical and 
academic scrutiny. Not all of that scrutiny has been favourable: mediation has 
challenged conventional assumptions about the role of the legal profession, the 
primacy of publicly declared rules, and issues such as the confidentiality of 
processes and outcomes. Much of that analysis has, however, drawn together 
the strands of political, communications, jurisprudential, international relations, 
intercultural and ethnic theory, to provide a rich tapestry of understanding the 
nature of conflict and its management. 
The combined effect of these two developments has been, on the one hand, 
the emergence of a complex network of professionals working in a range of 
fields of mediation and, on the other, the production of this significant body of 
empirical, theoretical and critical work, not only on mediation, but also more 
generally on the manner in which we learn to resolve conflicts. Both of these are 
“works in progress”. Regrettably, both the domestic and international spheres 
will continue to provide opportunities for both practice and empirical work. 
Regrettably, too, not all of the experiences will be unmitigated success stories. 
However, there is now sufficient depth in our combined experience of these last 
few decades to allow some sound conclusions to be drawn, on the basis of 
which practitioners may better judge their interventions and the prospects for 
success in mediation. 
Barbara Kemper’s paper is one such contribution to this ongoing analysis. At 
the outset, one of the important questions to be asked is as to what constitutes 
 “success” in mediation – whether this requires, in the international arena, the 
total cessation of hostilities or whether it can be measured in terms of more 
incremental, sometimes flawed steps towards that cessation. 
In addition to such outcome-oriented evaluations, important empirical and 
comparative research – of which this essay is an example – has explored the 
variables that are likely to contribute to the efficacy of mediator interventions. 
Whereas the early developments in mediation might now be regarded as rela-
tively naïve and idealistic, resting on assumptions that the process of mediation 
and the simple principles of confidentiality, disputant participation, and a non-
coercive role for mediators would produce “good” outcomes, it is now abun-
dantly clear that both conflict and mediation deserve a more richly textured 
analysis. 
Readers of this paper will find such an analysis. In particular, and by com-
paring two interventions in the same conflict in Aceh, the author is able to draw 
attention to those factors – variables – that shape the role and effectiveness of 
mediation and mediators. In particular, one factor stands out – principally be-
cause it appears to contradict the early principles of the non-intrusive, facilita-
tive mediator: in the international context at least, and probably in the domestic 
context, the capacity of the mediator to exercise “leverage” appears as a key 
factor.  This should hardly be surprising: if mediation is about effecting change, 
about facilitating and promoting movement in conflict, then what we look for 
are those factors which, within the boundaries of ethical and culturally sensitive 
practice, will allow or encourage change. 
Clearly, caution needs to be exercised in generalising from the analysis of 
one conflict. However, this paper permits the reader to return to one of the old-
est forms of conflict management and to identify ways of grounding profes-
sional practice in a better understanding of the role and impact of mediators.  
 
 
Prof. Ian Macduff 
 
Wellington, New Zealand, April 2007 
 
  
Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War in the 
late 1980s, a decrease of interstate and 
an increase of intrastate conflicts can 
be observed in the international arena. 
In 2005, 178 of the 249 counted crises 
were intrastate conflicts (see HIIK 
2005: 5). Moreover, the most violent 
conflicts, namely “severe crises” and 
“wars”,1 are intrastate. These conflicts 
- occasionally referred to as “new 
wars”2 (Münkler 2002) - present 
themselves as extremely brutal and 
devastating, especially when issues of 
ethnic diversity are involved (see 
Kriesberg 2001: 414; Rothman/Olson 
2001: 289). 
While intrastate conflicts provide 
many opportunities for their mana-
gement, mediation has received gro-
wing attention by peacemakers as the 
most complex and promising appro-
ach.3 However, though mediation has 
been practised widely in interstate 
wars, its use has been less popular in 
intrastate conflicts, which apparently 
                                                          
1  The term ”severe crisis“ is defined as a 
conflict in which “violent force is repeatedly 
used in an organized way“. The term “war” 
describes a type of violent conflict in which 
“violent force is used with a certain continuity 
in an organized and systematic way. The con-
flict parties exercise extensive measures, de-
pending on the situation. The extent of destruc-
tion is massive and of long duration” (HIIK 
2005: 3). 
2  In this context it must be taken into ac-
count that the term ”new wars“ is not beyond 
controversy. Though in reality the nature and 
impact of conflicts has changed due to global-
isation and technological as well as socio-
economical changes, it is argued that many of 
the so-called ”new wars“ not really reflect new 
types of warfare but an ongoing development, 
which has taken place over the whole past 
century (see Newman 2004: 185). 
3  See e.g. Bercovitch 2004: 1; Berco-
vitch/Rubin 1992; Bercovitch/Houston 1996; 
Folger/Jones 1994; Kressel/Pruitt 1989; Crocker 
et al. 1999b; Touval/Zartman 1985; Zart-
man/Rasmussen 1997. 
are much more difficult to mediate: 
between 1945 and 1993 in only four-
teen intrastate conflicts was a success-
ful negotiated settlement said to have 
been achieved (see Olson/Pearson 
2002: 421; Wallensteen 2002: 135). 
Even more, it has been determined 
that “negotiated settlements of civil 
wars are less likely to prevail than 
results of military victories” (Licklider 
1995: 685). 
In this context, it has been argued 
that track-one actors,4 who have the 
power to influence or to put pressure 
on the parties, were the more effective 
mediators (see Bercovitch/Derouen 
2004: 162; Bercovitch/Houston 2000: 
175). However, states show a tenden-
cy to reject such track-one mediation 
efforts, which is rooted in their fear of 
losing sovereignty and autonomy (see 
Bercovitch 2004: 2) and to appear as 
being incompetent to handle own 
domestic affairs. Therefore, mediation 
initiatives by nongovernmental actors 
gain increasing attention. While these 
actors already play an important role 
in such high-level violent conflicts in 
track-two diplomacy,5 or peace buil-
ding on the grassroots-level, they still 
rarely gain entry to mediate on a hig-
                                                          
4  The term track-one refers to “official 
representatives of a state or state-like authority 
and involves interaction with other states or 
state-like authorities“ (Nan 2003: 1). In contrast 
to that, the track-two level of a society might 
refer to its middle-range actors, such as aca-
demics, religious or ethnic leaders (see Leder-
ach 1997: 27), while the lowest, the so-called 
grassroots-level covers “all sorts of actors from 
communities to local NGOs and small associa-
tions that are usually based in the rural areas 
and could eventually represent some sort of 
local leadership, but not necessarily” (Table in 
Pfaffenholz 2003). 
5  For instance, by leading pre-negotiations, 
problem-solving workshops, or the facilitation 
of dialogue (see e.g. Fisher 2005; Bavly 1999; 
Havermans 1999; Kelman 2005). 
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her political level. However, in parti-
cular due to successful mediation 
activities of nongovernmental religi-
ous organizations, such as the Qua-
kers, Sant Egidio, or the World Coun-
cil of Churches (WCC) and the All 
African Conference of Churches 
(AACC), a strong argument exists that 
these intermediaries might have a 
higher potential for mediating 
intrastate conflicts because of their 
nongovernmental, non-political sta-
tus. 
It is therefore worth identifying 
the advantages of such actors in con-
trast to official interveners, particu-
larly given the fact that they, due to 
their status, generally have no coer-
cive power to influence the disputing 
parties at any time (see Aall 2001: 
374f.). The question arising at this 
stage is what conditions might be 
required for these actors to be success-
ful. Therefore, this study will focus on 
the leading research question under 
which conditions do track-two mediation 
activities contribute to the prevention of 
violence in intrastate conflicts? This core 
question is based on the assumption 
that track-two mediation has a poten-
tial to contribute to the prevention of 
violence in such conflicts even on a 
higher political and society level. 
By later comparing two mediation 
processes that have been conducted 
by track-two actors in Aceh, Indone-
sia, this study will contribute to the 
thinking on the particular potential of 
track-two mediators in this regard. 
Furthermore, it is an attempt to pro-
vide some deeper insight on factors, 
which appear to be most crucial for 
track-two mediation in intrastate 
conflicts to be successful. As in the 
academic field there already exists a 
huge range of such “prerequisites for 
achieving mediation success” (Klei-
boer 1996: 376), the objective here is to 
limit this number for more concrete 
research and clearer results, and to 
identify those conditions which ap-
pear to be most crucial in influencing 
a successful outcome of mediation. 
However, being aware of the limitati-
ons of this study and therefore of the 
depth of its analysis and results, this 
study does not claim to be exhaustive 
and the results need to be viewed 
with some caution. 
The following chapter will start by 
explaining the methodology for the 
subsequent analysis of the Aceh cases, 
including the presentation of working 
definitions used for this study. In 
chapter 2, the theoretical framework, 
encompassing the variables and 
hypotheses to be tested, will be intro-
duced. While chapter 3 offers brief 
background information on the Aceh 
conflict and the mediation processes 
that will be examined, in chapter 3.1 
twelve hypotheses will be tested on 
both cases. Chapter 3.2 will analyse 
the results of the case studies in order 
to extract those conditions, which 
seem to have been the most crucial to 
the mediation failure and success in 
the Aceh case. In chapter 4, these re-
sults will then be reviewed in light of 
the present state of debate in the lite-
rature to identify the possible contri-
bution of this study to the existing 
field of research. Finally, chapter 5 
will provide an overall conclusion on 
the findings of this paper and will 
suggest future research desiderata on 
this topic.6 
 
                                                          
6  This report is based on the master thesis, 
which the author submitted for the degree of 
the Master of Peace and Security Studies at the 
University of Hamburg. The author expresses 
appreciation to her supervisors, Christoph 
Weller (INEF, University of Duisburg-Essen) 
and Ian Macduff (Victoria University, Welling-
ton, New Zealand) for helpful comments. 
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1. Methodological Background 
In this chapter, the methodology for 
the subsequent analysis of the Aceh 
cases, including a range of working 
definitions used for this study, will be 
presented. Additionally, the choice of 
theory as well as of appropriate cases 
for the later analysis will be reflected. 
1.1 Structured Focussed 
Comparison 
The methodology used for the subse-
quent analysis will be a structured 
focussed comparison (see 
George/Bennett 2005: 67ff.). To identi-
fy those factors, which might be most 
crucial for successful track-two medi-
ation in intrastate conflicts, the re-
search design of this study will be 
based on a theory-testing comparative 
qualitative case study. Though theo-
ry-driven comparative case studies on 
this matter are said to be an exception 
(see Reiman 2004: 56), these might 
offer a deeper insight on a couple of 
really critical dimensions than quanti-
tative case studies are able to do (see 
Bercovitch/Regan 2002: 16). 
Twelve hypotheses on conditions 
identified as important to the success 
of a mediation process will be adop-
ted from the results of a hypothesis-
testing study on the Sudan by Hizkias 
Assefa (1987). In this case, summari-
zed under three clusters, Assefa has 
tested a variety of factors with regard 
to their influence on the successful 
outcome of mediation efforts that 
have been conducted by the WCC and 
AACC in Sudan in 1971/72. These 
various factors represent the inde-
pendent variables of his hypotheses. 
The dependant variable refers to the 
success of the mediation, therefore to 
its successful outcome (see Assefa 
1987: 12 f.). Those twelve hypotheses 
of Assefa, which have been supported 
by evidence in the Sudan case (see 
ibid: 151 ff.), will be discussed and 
adopted for the later analysis. 
As it is important in the methodo-
logy of structured focussed compari-
son to build “upon previous studies 
and variable definitions as much as 
possible” (George/Bennett 2005: 70), a 
clearly formulated theoretical frame-
work matching with the research fo-
cus of this study was required. So far, 
in the academic field a substantial 
number of quantitative case studies 
(see Bercovitch et al. 1991; Berco-
vitch/Houston 1996; Berco-
vitch/Derouen 2004; ibid, 2005; Na-
than 1999; Olson/Pearson 2002; Wil-
kenfeld et al. 2003) have been under-
taken with the objective to test and 
identify those conditions, which ap-
pear to have a certain impact on a 
mediation outcome. In this regard, 
different investigators have engaged 
in research on various conditions 
related to the success of mediation in 
international relations. As only few of 
them in their studies differentiate 
between interstate and intrastate 
conflicts but rather have applied a 
huge majority of conditions firstly 
discussed in the context of internatio-
nal crises to the latter one, a clear 
distinction in this respect cannot 
clearly be drawn. Therefore, the litera-
ture focussing on this topic is charac-
terized by a large quantity of material 
and is highly confusing following the 
“long-standing disputes” (Nathan 
1999: 14) on factors and conditions, 
which are said to influence the suc-
cess of a mediation process. 
Barbara Kemper 
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In contrast to other hypotheses ha-
ving been tested in different quantita-
tive or qualitative research, Assefa’s 
supported hypotheses result from a 
case study matching with all key 
components - intrastate conflict and 
track-two mediation - of this research as 
subsequently defined. Therefore, even 
though his theoretical framework is 
somewhat dated, it nevertheless ap-
peared worthwhile applying it for a 
further qualitative comparative case 
study. Using Assefa’s hypotheses, this 
research builds upon a previous study 
and variable definitions as much as 
possible (see George/Bennett 2005: 
70). Furthermore, Assefa’s hypotheses 
still represent the foundation of key 
variables, whose contributions to the 
success of mediation are discussed in 
the literature. Adopting his proven 
framework instead of creating a new 
theory out of the huge quantity of 
already existing material on success 
conditions for mediation in the inter-
national or intrastate context as men-
tioned above therefore allows placing 
this research within the framework of 
the established theory and literature. 
The approach chosen aims at identify-
ing the contribution this work might 
still have to offer to the existing field 
of research in this concrete matter, 
instead of merely further adding to 
the large quantity of already given 
material. Moreover, it provides a dee-
per insight on some apparently criti-
cal dimensions influencing the out-
come of mediation. 
1.2.  Definitions, Terms, 
Concepts 
Having reflected the choice of theory 
underlying the subsequent analysis, 
in the following the working defini-
tions for the key components of my 
research question – intrastate conflicts 
and track-two mediation – will be 
presented with the further objective to 
depict their applicability in context to 
the use of Assefa’s theoretical frame-
work. 
Intrastate Conflicts 
The term intrastate conflicts as used in 
this work refers to such violent armed 
conflicts, which in the scientific litera-
ture might be called (ethnic) civil wars 
(see Nathan 1999; Assefa 1987; Walter 
2002; Bercovitch/Derouen 2005), or 
ethno-political conflicts (see Ropers 
1997; Molzbichler 2004). Such conflicts 
furthermore can involve issues like 
secessionism, autonomy, or religion 
(see Bercovitch/Derouen 2005: 98) and 
therefore may include questions of 
identity, security, and a feeling of 
well-being (see Rupesinghe 1995: 71 
f.). 
While during the 19th and the be-
ginning of the 20th century predomi-
nantly interstate conflicts - meaning 
wars between different states – were 
the feature of the international arena 
(see Böge 2004: 3), intrastate conflicts 
often take place between the state and 
the civilian population, whereby the 
civilian population may belong to a 
different ethnicity or minority group 
than the dominant elite. However, 
intrastate conflicts often develop into 
crossing-border wars and become 
regionalized for example due to 
floods of refugees, or the building of 
refugee camps on territory close to the 
border in neighbouring states (see 
ibid). Therefore, the term intrastate 
conflict as used in this paper also 
covers such regionalized or internati-
onalised wars that take place within 
the bounds of a several states encom-
passing regional conflict system (see 
ibid).  
Although Assefa has described the 
Sudan case, on which he tested his 
hypotheses, as a “civil war” - in his 
Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts 
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theory referring to a conflict of seces-
sionism (see Assefa 1987: 4) – these 
can be adopted for the later analysis 
as the broader term “intrastate con-
flicts” as understood in this study 
encompasses such conflicts of seces-
sion. 
Track-Two Mediation 
This term is not easy to define in rela-
tion to other third party intervention 
strategies, such as arbitration, facilita-
tion or conciliation, good offices, fact-
finding, consultation or problem solv-
ing, and peacekeeping and the quite 
broad generic use of the term media-
tion within the academic field. While 
on the one hand mediation must be 
seen as closely related to these other 
methods, it needs to be sharply diffe-
rentiated from them in its rather pure 
form. Nevertheless, mediation may 
incorporate components of some of 
these other intervention tools, such as 
good offices or fact-finding (see Asse-
fa 1987: 4). Therefore, it will be defi-
ned as “the intervention in a negotia-
tion or a conflict of an acceptable third 
party who has limited or no authorita-
tive decision-making power, which 
assists the involved parties to volun-
tarily reach a mutually acceptable 
settlement of the issues in dispute. In 
addition to addressing substantive 
issues, mediation may also establish 
or strengthen relationships of trust 
and respect between parties or termi-
nate relationships in a manner that 
minimizes costs and psychological 
harm“ (Moore 2003: 15). Such an in-
tervention is a “pacific, non-coercive 
and non-binding approach to conflict 
management” (Fisher 2001: 4; Berco-
vitch 1997: 127), in which the parties, 
not the mediator, decide about accep-
ting the outcome of the process (see 
Ropers 1995: 48). 
 
 
List of further third-party intervention tools 
Good offices: 
Good offices is described as an intervention by a third-party only playing a 
“channel-role” between the conflicting parties for delivering messages and 
information (Bercovitch 1989: 285). 
Facilitation / Conciliation: 
The mediator holds a less active role than in mediation, basically trying to 
lead the conflicting parties to starting direct negotiations (Berridge 2002: 188; 
Fisher 2001: 11). Additionally, conciliation has been described as an attempt 
to resolve a dispute by examining it in depth by an independent third party, 
which afterwards provides non-binding recommendations for a settlement 
(Berridge 2002: 188). 
Consultation: 
This incorporates problem solving “through communication and analysis” by 
facilitative means by a third party (Bercovitch/Derouen 2004; 153; Fisher 
2001: 11; Fisher/ Keashley 1991: 33). 
Power mediation: 
While this strategy builds on the functions of mediation, it involves a third 
party using coercion or some kind of leverage during the mediation process 
(Fisher/Keashley 1991: 33). 
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Arbitration: 
Unlike mediation and its “non-coercive” and “inherently political” character 
(Bercovitch/Derouen 2005: 101; 2004: 153), this method uses judicial procedu-
res and ends with the return of a verdict by the third party the conflicting 
parties have to accept (Touval/Zartman 1989: 117). 
Peacekeeping: 
Peacekeeping involves the provision of military personnel by an outside par-
ty to supervise and monitor a ceasefire between the antagonists” (Fi-
sher/Keasley 1991: 34). 
 
In addition, within the academic 
field, there is no clear consensus on 
the meaning of track-two. Generally, 
this term will be less related to media-
tion than to “track-two diplomacy”. 
The latter, following its initial defini-
tion created by Montville in 1981 (see 
Bavly 1999: 51), refers to “unofficial, 
informal interaction between mem-
bers of adversary groups or nations, 
which aim to develop strategies, in-
fluence public opinion, and organize 
human and material resources in 
ways that might help resolve their 
conflict” (quoted from ibid: 8). Over 
the years, this “track-approach” has 
been further developed (see e.g. Mc-
Donald/Diamond 1996; Bavly 1999: 
10ff; Lederach 1997). 
With their Multi-Track-Diplomacy 
approach, which can also be found in 
the Multiparty Mediation approach by 
Crocker et al. (1999a) and the “More 
People and Key People” with “Individu-
al/Personal and Socio/Political” model 
by Anderson/Olson (2003: 54ff.), Mc-
Donald and Diamond (1996) for e-
xample, in expansion of the term 
track-two, have created a conceptual 
and practical framework of nine 
tracks. These describe the different 
levels on which peacemaking and 
conflict resolution should take place, 
and how they may refer to each other. 
In this context, especially Lederach 
(1997) needs to be referred to, as his 
approach is based on the idea that 
peace building most ideally should 
take place on a multi-track level. Fol-
lowing his Pyramid of Levels of Invol-
vement in Ethno political Conflict Mana-
gement model, the range of actors in 
conflict can be seen as a triangle. 
Within this framework, issue-based 
mediation is regarded as an instru-
ment used on the top leadership level, 
whereas more social-psychological 
approaches are seen as best used on 
the medium and grassroots level (see 
Lederach 1995: 207ff.). Lederach divi-
des the society of a conflicting party 
into three levels (tracks), on all of 
which different third party interven-
tion strategies, including mediation, 
can be applied. On a track-two level, 
he refers to the middle-range actors in 
a society, such as academics, religious 
or ethnic leaders (see ibid 1997: 27; 
Chigas 2003). 
For the purpose of this study, ho-
wever, the term track-two is related to 
the characteristic of the mediator (see 
Kay 2002/2003: 8; Hottinger 2005). 
Therefore, track-two mediation exclu-
sively refers to mediation activities as 
defined above, conducted by nongo-
vernmental, non-political persons (see 
Bailey 1985: 205), such as conflict reso-
lution professionals, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, or religious leaders 
and groups.7 Besides that, this study 
does not aim to cover the entire range 
                                                          
7  In this context see Bailey 1985, who uses 
the term “non-official mediation“. 
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of potential track-two mediation ef-
forts, but rather focuses on processes, 
which involve track-one participants, 
thus either official policy or decision 
makers of the conflicting parties – a 
combination occasionally referred to 
as “track-one-and-a- half”(Crocker et 
al. 1999a: 12; Lassila 2006). 
Referring briefly to Assefa’s theo-
ry, in the Sudan case the mediation 
processes had been conducted by two 
nongovernmental, non-political reli-
gious organisations, the AACC and 
WCC, and therefore by track-two 
mediators as defined in this paper. 
1.3. Methodological Reflection 
on the Choice of 
Comparable Cases 
The cases on which Assefa’s twelve 
supported hypotheses will be tested 
will be two mediation processes both 
of which have been conducted by 
track-two actors during the conflict in 
Aceh. These have been the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) and 
the Crisis Management Initiative 
(CMI) of former Finnish President 
Martii Athisaari. The objective of this 
study is to compare two mediation 
processes in terms of both success and 
failure. In both cases Assefa’s hypo-
theses will be tested in order to 
extract some key conditions whose 
variance may be the reason for the 
different outcomes of the mediation 
processes with regard to the depen-
dant variable (see George/Bennett 
2005: 81). With this approach, a 
further identification of some of Asse-
fa’s key conditions as being most cru-
cial within a “ranking” might be pos-
sible and offer some deeper insights. 
The two Aceh processes, which 
will be analysed, have been chosen for 
several reasons: firstly, because they 
both cover all characteristics, which 
match with the leading research 
question of this paper. Secondly, the 
criteria for the choice of comparable 
research subjects had been to find two 
cases, which showed as many simila-
rities in as many aspects as possible, 
but varied with regard to the depen-
dant variable. These conditions and 
variables, which account for the diffe-
rent outcomes as observable differen-
ces between such cases in relation to 
the dependent variable then can only 
be associated with the independent 
variable (see Burnham et al., 2004: 80, 
63). As the two Aceh mediation pro-
cesses differ in their outcome while 
being related to the same conflict and 
having both been conducted by track-
two mediators, though unpredictable 
variables and changing conflict dy-
namics must be taken into account, 
they presented themselves as best 
suitable. 
In addition to that, besides their topi-
cality, these processes have been cho-
sen due to the need to find cases that 
are sufficiently documented for 
testing the hypotheses. The material 
used for this work had to be taken out 
of secondary literature, such as books, 
articles from various professional 
journals and texts of organizations 
and institutions offered in the Inter-
net. This material has been written by 
scholars and academics as well as by 
practitioners with field experience. 
Additionally, professional journals 
have frequently been used. Referring 
to the empirical analysis of the Aceh 
cases, the policy studies of the East-
West Centre Washington need to be 
mentioned most notably. These have 
been chosen as they provide a detai-
led description and partial analysis of 
lessons learnt with regard to the 
respective mediation processes. Fur-
thermore, as these studies in large 
part are based on extensive interviews 
with the actors having been involved 
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in the processes as well as on Indone-
sian newspaper articles, they presen- 
ted themselves as reliable. 
 
2. Assefa’s Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, Assefa’s theoretical 
framework, on which the later analy-
sis will build on, will be presented. 
Hizkias Assefa’s study (1987) con-
sists of three parts. In the beginning of 
his work, the author has provided a 
brief overview of the then state of 
mediation theory in order to develop 
hypotheses on useful conditions, 
which contribute to the success of 
mediation in civil wars. He has used 
three different clusters, under which 
he has summarized these various 
factors related to the nature and charac-
teristics of the conflict, the characteristics 
of the parties, and the characteristics and 
skills of the mediator. In the second 
part, he factually and historically has 
described the Sudan Civil War that 
lasted from 1955 until 1972 by exami-
ning its root causes, dynamics as well 
as the peace process. In this part, he 
has further depicted the successful 
mediation process that had been con-
ducted by the WCC and AACC in 
Sudan in 1971/72 and which led to the 
signing of a peace agreement. In the 
last part of his work, Assefa then 
brings together the theory and practi-
ce by analysing those factors, which 
apparently had been important for the 
successful outcome of the mediation. 
Twelve of Assefa’s created hypothe-
ses on conditions identified as impor-
tant to the success of a mediation pro-
cess were either supported by the 
Sudan case or partly needed to be 
reformulated. These hypotheses will 
be distilled for the subsequent case 
study on Aceh. 
2.1  Variables 
The independent variables of the hy-
potheses present the conditions re-
garded as influential for a mediation 
outcome. The dependant variable 
refers to the success of the mediation, 
therefore to its successful outcome 
(see Assefa 1987: 12 f.). As Assefa has 
not explained its dependant variable 
in detail, mediation success will be 
regarded as related to behavioural 
indicators defining the conflict in its 
different stages during the mediation 
process (see Bercovitch/Regan 2002: 
7). That might be the prevention of 
violence, or the achievement of some 
sort of agreement. The prevention of 
violence again is understood as the 
reduction, mitigation, or even ending 
of direct, physical violence in the 
conflict. 
The achieved successful outcome 
as defined above is expected to last at 
least for a period of six months. That 
is, because a time period between six 
and twelve months is said to be the 
most critical time fraught with uncer-
tainty with regard to the re-
occurrence of violence or the breaking 
of an agreement (see Aspinall 2005a: 
ix; Huber 2004: 10). The minimum 
expected time period has been chosen 
for two reasons: firstly, though a peri-
od of six months is clearly not enough 
to resolve the root causes and issues 
of a conflict, after such time policy 
makers can at least claim a first suc-
cess for holding on to the conflict 
resolution process. Secondly, it pre- 
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sents a sufficient break in fighting to 
get the parties prepared and become 
open minded to starting a meaningful 
dialogue (see Regan 1996: 343). In 
diametrical opposition to this defini-
tion of mediation success, the media-
tion is regarded as having failed when 
no improvement in the parties’ beha-
viour can be indicated, or when this 
improvement has not outlasted the 
period of six months. 
In the following, the independent 
variables depicting the conditions 
Assefa had identified as important for 
a mediation success will be presented 
as hypotheses to be tested in the cho-
sen case studies. For this analysis, 
Assefa’s classification of these factors 
into three different clusters will be 
adopted. 
2.2  Hypotheses 
The nature and characteristics of the 
conflict 
Concerning the nature and character-
istics of the conflict, Assefa’s first 
hypothesis supported by evidence of 
the Sudan case refers to the influence 
of the duration of a conflict on the me-
diation outcome. Assefa found that 
the duration of a conflict contributes 
to the success of the mediation pro-
cess if it lasts long enough for the 
parties to test and therefore become 
aware of each other’s strength (see 
1987: 194). He further hypothesized in 
this context that a stalemate, when 
accompanied by the parties’ perception 
of high and rising costs in case of on-
going fighting, were needed to achie-
ve a successful outcome of the media-
tion process (see ibid: 195). Therefore, 
two different hypotheses can be for-
mulated: 
(H1) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful, the 
longer the duration of the conflict. 
(H2) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful when a 
stalemate exists and the parties 
have the perception of high and ri-
sing costs in case of non-
settlement. 
Referring to the issues in conflict, it 
has been proven by the Sudan case 
that the multiplicity or the multidimen-
sionality of issues in negotiations con-
tributes to a successful mediation 
outcome (see ibid: 197). Furthermore, 
it has been seen that “zero-sum issues”, 
and in concrete conflicts over secessi-
onism, were typically not resolvable 
by mediative means. Assefa has ar-
gued that on the one hand the questi-
on of autonomy created space for 
negotiations; on the other hand he 
doubted that the mediation would 
have been successful had the Sudan 
rebels stuck to their aim to achieve an 
independent sovereign state (see ibid: 
196). Therefore, the subsequent hypo-
theses can be articulated: 
(H3) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
unlikely to be successful when the-
se deal with zero-sum issues such 
as secession, as long as the insur-
gents’ goal is that of achieving an 
independent sovereign state. 
(H4) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful the 
greater the number and dimensi-
ons of the issues in the conflict. 
The characteristics of the parties 
Concerning the characteristics of the 
parties, it has been proven by Assefa 
that a clear identification and an inner 
unity of the parties are of importance  
 
Barbara Kemper 
 
16 
for the successful outcome of media-
tion (see ibid: 191). Besides that, the 
Sudan case provides evidence that the 
absence of earlier personal animosity 
between the parties contributes to a 
successful mediation process. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
(H5) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful the mo-
re clearly identifiable and inwardly 
cohesive the parties are, and when 
there is no intense personal 
conflict among the leaders of the 
warring groups. 
The last hypothesis comprised under 
this cluster questions the impact of 
the parties’ dependence on outside powers 
support on the mediation process. 
Assefa’s results from the Sudan case 
lead to the following hypothesis (see 
ibid: 194): 
(H6) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful, the 
more the parties to the conflict rea-
lize their sense of weakness as a re-
sult of the unreliability of outside 
powers´ help. 
The characteristics and skills of the 
mediator 
Concerning the characteristics and skills 
of the mediator, Assefa examined a list 
suggested by Ott (see 1972: 599). This 
list covers factors such as impartiality, 
independence or neutrality, acceptabi-
lity and respectability by the parties, 
knowledge and skills, leverage, inter-
national support, and the potential of 
the mediator to provide the required 
physical resources. Following Assefa, 
the mediators in Sudan displayed 
most of these characteristics (see 1987: 
197), of which only few have been 
discussed in detail. Therefore, Asse-
fa’s general hypothesis will be adop-
ted as far as it has been supported by 
evidence: 
(H7) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful when 
the mediator is impartial; indepen-
dent from the parties; acceptable to 
both; has the respect of all the par-
ties; is credible as one with past 
success in settling disputes; has 
the knowledge and skills to deal 
with the issues; and has the requi-
red physical resources.  
Besides that, the question of the me-
diator’s leverage received special atten-
tion. As Assefa could not come to any 
clear conclusion on that topic, refer-
ring to the most he was able to say, 
the following hypothesis of him will 
be provided (see ibid: 198): 
(H8) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful when 
the intermediary has a certain a-
mount of leverage, be it moral or 
material, although the amount of 
leverage may not have to be very 
great.  
With regard to the necessary knowl-
edge and skills a mediator should pos-
sess, Assefa offers the following enu-
meration: conflict situation analysis 
skills; empathy; active listening; sense 
of timing; knowledge, trust and 
credibility development; skills and 
knowledge in mediation, communica-
tion, imagination; skills in joint-
costing; meaning to help the parties 
calculate their costs; and skills and 
knowledge in crisis management (see 
ibid: 26). As Assefa states that it is 
hardly possible to find a mediator 
fulfilling these entire range of requi-
rements, or to analyse if each of these 
conditions have been provided in the 
process, his following more general 
hypothesis will be offered (see ibid: 
197): 
(H9) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful when 
the mediator satisfies a substantial 
package of knowledge and skills. 
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Assefa further refers to the sense of 
timing a mediator should consider 
when deciding to intervene in a con-
flict (see ibid: 198). This question is 
related to considerations on the “ri-
peness” of a conflict for intervention 
and if it were important to create such 
a moment (see Rubin. 1991: 238). The 
findings from the Sudan case lead to 
the hypothesis that: 
(H10) The sooner the mediator becomes 
involved in the conflict instead of 
waiting on the outside for the ap-
propriate time, and by trial and er-
ror, regulates his or her activities 
according to the opportunities and 
constraints of the situation, the 
more likely is the mediation to suc-
ceed. 
In relation to the potential of nongov-
ernmental actors in the role of the me-
diator in intrastate conflicts and 
closely linked to the question of lever-
age of such actors, Assefa concluded 
from the Sudan case that the connec-
tion of a mediator to an international 
nongovernmental, non-political or-
ganization would contribute to the 
success of the mediation (see ibid 
1987: 200). Therefore, it can be hypo-
thesized that: 
(H11) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful when 
the mediator is assumed to belong 
to an international nongovern-
mental, non-political organisation. 
In relation to the stalemate issue, 
Assefa has also discussed a possible 
strategy called “empowerment”. He has 
questioned if, and to what extent the 
mediator could support the weaker 
disputant to achieve power parity 
between the conflicting parties (see 
ibid: 195). The Sudan case supported 
the assumption that such a strategy 
must not be that obvious that the me-
diator’s neutrality can be questioned. 
Consequently, the following hypothe-
sis can be provided: 
(H12) Mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful when 
without endangering the neutral 
position of the mediator a non-
visible empowerment of the weaker 
conflicting party increases her 
bargaining potential. 
In this chapter, by presenting Assefa’s 
hypotheses and a detailed definition 
of crucial variables the theoretical 
framework for the following com-
parative case study has been outlined. 
Below, this theory will be tested on 
the two Aceh mediation processes in 
order to identify those conditions, 
which appear to be crucial for track-
two mediation to be most likely suc-
cessful in intrastate conflicts. 
 
3. Aceh – Mediation Activities Towards Peace? 
The Aceh conflict has been one of 
Asia's longest-running internal crises. 
An armed struggle for independence 
from Indonesia led by the separatist 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) began in 
1976 and was fostered and accompa-
nied by many grievances for the 
Acehnese civil society relating to hu-
man rights abuses as well as to the 
distribution of natural resource in-
comes. 
When HDC got involved in Aceh 
at the end of 1999 and started to facili-
tate the first dialogue process ever 
between representatives of the Go-
vernment of the Republic of Indonesia 
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(GoI) and the leadership of GAM, the 
conflict up to then had cost about 
10,000 lives. HDC managed to lead 
the negotiations into two cease-fires: 
the “Humanitarian Pause”, which 
came into effect in May 2000 and bro-
ke down in 2001, and the Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement (COHA)8, 
which was signed on December 9, 
2002. Particularly the COHA was 
intended to build the basis for peace 
negotiations towards final solutions 
for the political issues at stake. 
Further, for the implementation of the 
COHA, a Joint Security Committee 
(JSC)9 was established to monitor its 
compliance. During the first three 
months after its signing, the COHA 
led to a significant decrease of violen-
ce down from 87 fatalities a month in 
the nine months before the signing of 
the COHA (see Reid 2004: 312), to 
only 15 casualties in the month of its 
signing (see HDC: Aceh-Overview). 
Nevertheless, within a period of six 
months after its signing, violence re-
escalated in Aceh, ending in the revo-
cation of the COHA and the declara-
tion of martial law by the GoI aimed 
at the complete annihilation of GAM. 
This was followed by the severest and 
largest attacks against Aceh launched 
by the Indonesian military (see Huber 
2004: 1ff.). 
In the two years that followed the 
failure of the COHA, these attacks 
                                                          
8  For further information on the content of 
the COHA, please see HD, Centre for Humani-
tarian Dialogue, Aceh, Indonesia <http://www. 
hdcentre.org/Aceh%2C+Indonesia> (last access 
July 3, 2006). 
9  Consisting of only 148 personnel in March 
2003 of which 48 were unarmed peace-monito-
ring teams from the Philippines as well as Thai-
land which worked alongside GAM and repre-
sentatives of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia 
(TNI), the Indonesian military, this mechanism 
in the end was powerless and not able to deal 
with upcoming spoiling activities and viola-
tions of the COHA due to its structural weak-
ness (see Sukma 2004: 20; Huber 2004: 35ff.). 
against GAM continued. At the end of 
2004, talks reopened again aiming at a 
resumption of the peace negotiations. 
In January 2005, following the tsuna-
mi catastrophe in December 2004, 
with the involvement of CMI the 
conflicting parties got back to the 
bargaining table. These negotiations 
between the GoI and GAM finally 
resulted in the signing of a new 
agreement, the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MoU)10 on August 15, 
2005 (see Aspinall 2005a: viif.). In 
comparison to the negotiation phase 
from January till August 2005, when 
violence increased steadily resulting 
in 179 deaths and 172 injuries, since 
the signing of the MoU a significant 
drop of violent clashes could be noted 
(see Sukma 2005: 13). At the time of 
writing, the peace process remains on 
track (see ICG 2006, N° 48) and has 
been monitored by the Aceh Monito-
ring Mission (AMM)11, which ensured 
the implementation of the MoU (see 
Sukma 2005: 12).12 
                                                          
10  By signing the MoU, the parties commit-
ted themselves to aim at achieving a permanent 
peaceful settlement. For example, it contains 
agreements on the future governing of Aceh, 
the political participation of the province, eco-
nomic issues, the rule of law, human rights 
issues, and rules for amnesty and reintegration 
of GAM fighters into society. For further infor-
mation, please see CMI, <http://www.cmi.fi/ 
files/Aceh_MoU.pdf> (last access July 1, 2006). 
11  The AMM had been deployed by member 
countries of the European Union (EU) and the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as well as Norway and Switzerland 
and became operational on September 15, 2005. 
The AMM stayed involved in Aceh until De-
cember 15, 2006, when it finally retreated from 
Aceh. 
12  For more detailed information on the 
mediation processes, please see HD, Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, Aceh, Indonesia – 
Activities, <http://www.hdcentre.org/Aceh% 2C 
+Indonesia> (last access July 3, 2006) and CMI, 
<http://www.cmi.fi/?content=aceh_project> (last 
access January 28, 2007). 
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3.1 Testing the Hypotheses 
By analysing the period over nearly 
four years that HDC was involved in 
the Aceh conflict, this process can be 
distinguished into four phases during 
which HDC played different roles: the 
pre-negotiation phase, the actual ne-
gotiation phase, the phase of the 
agreement itself, and the phase of its 
implementation (see Huber 2004: 70). 
For the purpose of this study and 
with regard to the interdependence 
and interplay of the different phases, 
the whole process needs to be taken 
into account. However, the particular 
focus of the analysis will lie on the 
negotiations which began in January 
2001, as at this time the dialogue 
changed into official peace talks (see 
Leary 2004: 314), finally leading to the 
signing of the COHA as the more 
critical and especially latter agree-
ment. The preliminary facilitation 
process to these dialogues and the 
“Humanitarian Pause” as an interim 
agreement are interpreted as having 
formed the basis for further series of 
discussions (see ibid). Nevertheless, 
when testing the hypotheses on this 
formal mediation process, the impact 
of the preceding initiatives (see ibid) 
will be taken into account. 
In the following, Assefa’s hypothe-
ses will be tested on both Aceh pro-
cesses conducted by HDC (Aceh I) 
and CMI (Aceh II), beginning with 
those belonging to Assefa’s first 
cluster of conditions related to the 
nature and characteristics of the con-
flict. 
Hypotheses on the nature and 
characteristics of the conflict 
Hypothesis 1: In reference to the charac-
teristics of the conflict, it has been sug-
gested that mediation in intrastate con-
flicts is more likely to be successful, the 
longer the duration of the conflict. 
Aceh I: The separatist conflict in 
Aceh existed since the declaration of 
Aceh’s independence by Hasan di 
Tiro, the founder of GAM, in 1976 (see 
Huber 2004: 90; Aspinall/Crouch 2003: 
87). Therefore, when HDC intervened 
in 1999, the conflict had already lasted 
for more than twenty years, long e-
nough for both parties to become 
aware of and extensively test each 
other’s strengths and weaknesses. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent the 
later recurrence of violence and the 
failure of the COHA and of the medi-
ation process. It can be assumed that 
the duration of the conflict might 
have had some influence at least on 
the decision of the parties to agree on 
peace talks. However, given the final 
failure of the mediation, the Aceh I 
case does not offer corroborative evi-
dence that mediation is more likely to 
be successful the longer the duration 
of a conflict. 
Aceh II: At the end of 2004 / early 
2005 when peace talks reopened, the-
re still existed this mutual awareness 
of each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses. That probably partly 
influenced the disputants’ decision to 
get back at the bargaining table. 
Though, GAM was also confronted 
with an increasing battle fatigue 
within its lines and a fading support 
of its followers. That appears to have 
resulted rather from the increased 
intensity of Indonesia’s military ac-
tions against Aceh since the declarati-
on of martial law in 2003 than from 
the mere duration of the conflict (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 8; ICG 2005: 1). Alrea-
dy in the past, GAM had repeatedly 
presented itself as being able to retreat 
in the underground when being in the 
defensive and weakened by military 
suppression, just to finally resurrect 
again with new military power (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 12). Therefore, it is 
difficult to answer this hypothesis in 
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the affirmative. Furthermore, with 
regard to the marginal time difference 
between the two mediation efforts in 
comparison to the duration of the 
conflict overall, at least it does not 
appear proper to regard this factor as 
having had a strong and meaningful 
impact on the positive mediation out-
come of this process. 
 
Hypothesis 2: It has further been hypothe-
sized that mediation in intrastate conflicts 
is more likely to be successful when a 
stalemate exists and the parties have the 
perception of high and rising costs in case 
of non-settlement. 
Aceh I: When HDC got involved in 
the conflict in late 1999, the parties 
faced a hurting military stalemate (see 
Aspinall/Crouch 2003: 11; Kay 
2002/2003: 3). However, at the time of 
the signing of the COHA in 2002, the 
parties did not face this pressure a-
nymore (see Huber 2004: 3), but were 
aware of the very high costs a return 
to war would involve (see Reid 2004: 
313). As the mediation failed, in turn 
it could be assumed that the existence 
of a stalemate in addition to the mere 
awareness of high and rising costs 
might have contributed to a positive 
outcome of this process. 
On the other hand, the given facts 
do not necessarily lead to such a conc-
lusion. However, the existence of a 
stalemate in addition to the mere a-
wareness of high and rising costs at 
least would have caused the parties 
much more pressure for change. That 
would have further fostered the par-
ties’ will to adhere to the agreement 
and the absence of the reuse of vio-
lence. Therefore, it seems probable 
that mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful if a stale-
mate under such conditions is given, 
though the hypothesis cannot be an-
swered in the affirmative without 
reservation. 
Aceh II: Contrary to the time of the 
failure of the COHA, when peace 
talks started again at the end of 
2004/early 2005, not a mutual but 
rather a one-sided stalemate existed at 
the disadvantage of GAM (see ICG 
2005: 4). GAM had suffered serious 
setbacks especially presented by the 
killing of a substantial number of its 
fighters following the ongoing and 
striking military operations against 
Aceh (see Aspinall 2005a: 8). This had 
led to a battle fatigue within its lines 
(see above), which even worsened 
following the tsunami catastrophe as 
well as the then even more intensified 
military operations conducted by TNI 
(see ICG 2005: 5). This combat fatigue 
and the perceptible decline in its 
ranks accompanied by the awareness 
of high and rising costs presented a 
peaceful solution much more appea-
ling to GAM than the alternative of 
ongoing fighting. Unlike GAM, the 
TNI had experienced some “high-
profile victories” (Aspinall 2005a: 8) 
and was not confronted by the sense 
of a hurting stalemate (see ibid: 13). 
Following this, though obviously no 
mutually hurting stalemate existed, 
the mediation process led to a suc-
cessful outcome.  
While the question remains why 
the GoI did not try to completely an-
nihilate GAM at that stage, this might 
have resulted from its awareness of 
the costs that would accompany an 
ongoing war (see Kassim 2005). Besi-
des that, at least some members of the 
GoI had realized that despite GAM’s 
weaker position a military victory 
would not be easily achievable (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 13). The parties had 
begun to realize that “their previous 
violent strategies were failing” (ibid: 
66). According to that, the Aceh II 
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case suggests that not only a mutual, 
but also even a one-sided stalemate 
accompanied by both parties’ aware-
ness of high costs and the assumption 
that a final military victory remains 
questionable, contributes to the suc-
cess of mediation.  
However, in that context two con-
flict-external influencing variables 
must be taken into account. Firstly, 
the willingness of a relatively newly 
elected GoI of Susilo Bambang Yud-
hoyono as president and Jusuf Kalla 
as vice president, whose policy was 
directed at defending and favouring a 
peaceful solution to the conflict (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 37); and secondly, the 
impact the tsunami had on the region 
and both parties.13 
 
Hypothesis 3: In relation to the impact of 
zero-sum issues on a mediation process, it 
has been suggested that mediation in 
intrastate conflicts is unlikely to be suc-
cessful when these deal with zero-sum 
issues such as secession, as long as the 
insurgents’ goal is that of achieving an 
independent sovereign state. 
Aceh I: During the whole HDC 
mediation process, the conflicting 
parties found themselves in a “fragile 
bargaining zone” (Huber 2004: 30). 
The GoI did not take into considerati-
on a possible secession of Aceh from 
Indonesia but rather felt irrevocably 
                                                          
13  The tsunami is partly regarded as having 
been a significant factor in changing the dy-
namics of the conflict, as both conflicting par-
ties within a couple of days after the catastro-
phe announced a ceasefire and their return to 
negotiations (see Sukma 2005: 5, 10). Others 
interpret its impact as less decisive but rather 
understand it as a “circuit breaker” (Aspinall 
2005a: 16) due to the fact that the first steps 
towards new peace talks already started in 
2004, before the tsunami hit Aceh. Neverthe-
less, this catastrophe at least provided the 
parties with the moral obligation and justifica-
tion to return to peace negotiations without 
losing face (see ibid: 2, 21; Sukma 2005: 6).  
committed to Indonesia’s territorial 
integrity (see Aspinall/Crouch 2003: 
x). In contrast to that, GAM continued 
insisting on Aceh’s independence in a 
way incompatibly opposed to the 
absolute highest level of autonomy 
the GoI was willing to offer for nego-
tiations (see Aspinall 2005a: 4; Huber 
2004: 30). Even though in 2001 the GoI 
had already proposed a law on speci-
al autonomy for Aceh (see Aspi-
nall/Crouch 2003: 25)14,, GAM first 
refused to compromise. Later, GAM 
at least agreed that a new framework 
for talks could – as an interim solution 
– be based on autonomy (see HD, 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue: 
Aceh, Indonesia-Activities). 
While a peace agreement was rea-
ched, GAM after the signing of the 
COHA emphasized again that it 
would stick to its independence claim. 
This did not leave any room for 
further negotiations to reach a mutu-
ally durable agreement in relation to 
political solutions but left both parties 
irreconcilables (see Schulze 2004: 46, 
48; Reid 2004: 45; Sukma 2005: 8). The 
GoI started undermining the COHA 
and finally used pressure on GAM by 
threatening it with an ultimatum be-
fore launching its military coups, 
which ended in the final collapse of 
the COHA on May 18, 2003 and the 
declaration of martial law against 
Aceh (see Aspinall/Crouch 2003: 1). 
It can be presumed though that 
had GAM moved away from its inde-
pendence claim and forward towards 
some compromise, the mediation 
might have been successful. The go-
vernment had more scope for conces-
sions in terms of autonomy, but 
would have never accepted Aceh’s 
                                                          
14  The Special Autonomy Law 2001 con-
tained “provisions on natural resource revenue 
sharing, political arrangements, and religious 
and cultural autonomy” (Aspinall 2005a: 5). 
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secession from Indonesia. Due to the-
se facts, this case supports the hypo-
thesis that a mediation process cannot 
succeed as long as rebels in conflicts 
over such “lose-all” or “win-all” is-
sues (see Assefa 1987: 22) do not disa-
vow their main claim for independen-
ce. 
Aceh II: During the first round of 
the formal peace talks of CMI’s inter-
vention, both parties still irrevocably 
stuck to their own views. The situati-
on only changed when GAM during 
the second and third round of the 
peace talks suddenly declared its – if 
not permanent then at least tempora-
ry - withdrawal from its independen-
ce claim (see Panontongan 2005). 
GAM then aimed at a solution based 
on “self-government” (see Aspinall 
2005a: 26). 
This offer is regarded as a major 
indicator for the breakthrough to the 
peace talks (see ibid). The parties we-
re finally able to step back from the 
discussion deadlock they were facing 
(see ibid: 27) towards a newly found 
basis for dialogue, compromise and 
concessions, unlikely to have been 
possible otherwise. The newly raised 
issue of “self-governing” paved the 
way for a new direction in and built 
the basis for negotiations on issues 
important for achieving “a workable 
political agreement” (ibid: 66). GAM’s 
offer contributed strongly to the pos-
sible final signing of the MoU as a 
much more robust agreement, and 
following this to a significant decrease 
of violence still lasting today. This 
provides evidence for the reverse 
hypothesis that as long as the insur-
gents stick to their aim to achieve a 
sovereign, independent state, media-
tion is unlikely to be successful. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Under the same cluster it 
has further been contented that mediation 
in intrastate conflicts is more likely to be 
successful the greater the number and 
dimensions of the issues in the conflict. 
Aceh I: In the Aceh I case, the is-
sues in dispute were complex. 
Throughout the whole time of HDC’s 
involvement, these were addressed in 
diverse peace negotiation talks (see 
Huber 2004: 47f.). Nevertheless, this 
did not prevent the failure of the me-
diation process. The reason might be 
that although a great number of topics 
was identified and framed in pre-
negotiation workshops as well as 
during talks in 2002, these issues were 
not discussed in terms of content be-
fore the signing of the COHA.15 In 
fact, they were only laid down in 
summary documents without binding 
character for further consultation (see 
ibid: 26). Therefore, the negotiations 
remained limited to “framework dis-
cussions” about a ceasefire and its 
best implementation and monitoring, 
the disarmament of GAM, and an all-
inclusive dialogue in which the vari-
ous other political topics should later 
be addressed (see Aspinall/Crouch 
2003: 46). The failure of having sub-
stantive peace talks put an enormous 
pressure on GAM, which should dis-
arm without having any guarantee 
and safety that afterwards their politi-
cal issues would be taken into serious 
consideration (see ibid). 
With regard to the later failure of 
the mediation, this leads to the as-
sumption that the pure complexity 
and identification of issues in conflict 
by itself is not of advantage. It can 
rather be reckoned that involving a 
                                                          
15  As one of the HDC mediators in Aceh, Bill 
Dowell, stated: “The first thing we have to do is 
(agree) a ceasefire in the field. After that, we 
can discuss the political solution” (as quoted in 
BBC News Online, November 19, 2002). 
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greater number of divisive issues in 
the preliminary negotiations in terms 
of content might have led to a suc-
cessful outcome of the process. Firstly, 
this could have fostered trust building 
between the belligerents and could 
have offered both parties more oppor-
tunities to move forward towards 
compromise (see ibid). Secondly, had 
these issues been already addressed 
in the COHA, it might have appeared 
as a much more comprehensive poli-
tical document than rather a pure 
arrangement on the cessation of vio-
lence. This way, the parties might 
have been more motivated and espe-
cially trusting to stick to it. 
On the other hand, this conclusion 
is not without reservations. The inclu-
sion of a multiplicity of issues, which 
might have (partially) presented 
themselves as intractable ones, could 
have also further complicated and in 
the end sabotaged the ceasefire dis-
cussions (see ibid: 47). Therefore, this 
hypothesis cannot be affirmed un-
questionably. 
Aceh II: In contrast to the HDC in-
tervention, CMI, and in particular 
Ahtisaari, used the formula “nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed” 
(see Aspinall 2005a: 23). A huge num-
ber and dimension of issues were 
already addressed in terms of content 
during the negotiations and then laid 
down in the MoU.16 Once GAM had 
stepped back from its independence 
claim, this strategy fostered the posi-
tive development of the negotiations. 
CMI could force both parties to work 
out manageable compromises on the 
core issues in dispute (see ibid: 1f, 23; 
Sukma 2005: 11) by teaching them to 
                                                          
16  These were related to questions of secu-
rity and demilitarisation, monitoring and en-
forcement, amnesty and economic compensa-
tion for former GAM fighters, and to the politi-
cal status of Aceh in the coming future (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 22; Sukma 2005: 11). 
deeply and creatively think about 
their needs and how far they actually 
differed. This approach and the pos-
sible complexity of the agenda made 
it easier for the parties to provide 
mutual incentives as well as to make 
concessions (see Aspinall 2005a: 23). 
Consequently, this case proves the 
hypothesis that a multiplicity and 
complexity of issues affect the success 
of mediation by offering the mediator 
the possibility to foster a more creati-
ve interaction between the conflicting 
parties, directed at achieving 
compromise and flexibility. Though it 
remains questionable if this approach 
would have also been successful 
without the previous intervention of 
HDC from which CMI profited (see 
Arola 2005), had the rebels stuck to 
their independence claim, and had the 
conflict dynamics been similar to tho-
se at the time of HDC’s intervention. 
Hypotheses on the characteristics of 
the parties 
Hypothesis 5: Concerning the characteris-
tics of the parties it has been contended 
that mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful the more 
clearly identifiable and internally cohesive 
the parties are, and when there is no in-
tense personal conflict among the leaders 
of the warring groups.17 
Aceh I: This assumption has been 
proven with respect to the HDC me-
diation process. Referring to GAM, it 
was difficult for HDC to determine 
the best negotiation partner, as lea-
ding figures of GAM were difficult to 
                                                          
17  In this context, it has further been sug-
gested that an existing intense personal conflict 
between the leaders of the disputing parties 
would affect the mediation process. With re-
gard to the Aceh case, due to a lack of informa-
tion about the personal relationships between 
the respective leaders and persons involved in 
the negotiation process, this hypothesis can 
neither be confirmed nor refuted. 
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identify. Though the GoI preferred to 
negotiate with the Malaysia-based 
“Free Aceh Movement Government 
Council”, known as Majelis Pemerin-
tahan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (MP-
GAM), HDC finally prioritized solely 
on GAM’s leadership in Sweden as it 
was more present on the ground (see 
Ishak 2002). Furthermore, GAM threa-
tened not to participate in dialogues if 
MP-GAM or non-GAM Acehnese 
would get involved in the process (see 
Huber 2004: 51). The difficulties in the 
representation of GAM were directly 
associated with the problems of its 
internal cohesiveness (see ibid). 
Though GAM fighters in Aceh gener-
ally stayed loyal to their exiled lead-
ership, nevertheless Aceh’s provincial 
leaders acted partially in a debilitative 
and counterproductive way (see ibid: 
53). 
Additionally, the Indonesian side 
was also deeply divided.18 According 
to its inner dissension, a clear identifi-
cation of key people for the negotiati-
ons was difficult. HDC first failed to 
get the Indonesian military on board. 
Although later meetings between 
GAM and TNI commanders took 
place (see Ishak 2002), this is said to 
have worsened the existing tensions 
between the diverse Indonesian par-
ties. Later on, this failure was reflec-
ted in spoiling activities during the 
implementation phases first of the 
Humanitarian Pause and then of the 
COHA, which disturbed the peace 
process (see Panontongan 2005; Hu-
ber 2004: 22).  
Furthermore, the disunity within 
the Indonesian side went that far that 
                                                          
18  Various groups, in particular the TNI 
already rejected the beginning of the peace talks 
(see Aspinall/Crouch 2003: 2ff.). It did not 
accept GAM as a negotiation partner (see Ishak 
2002) and held the opinion that the only solu-
tion to the conflict would be its complete anni-
hilation (see ibid: 13). 
former Indonesian President Mega-
wati did not even publicly announce 
the signing of the COHA to sell the 
peace process to the civil society or to 
parliamentary bodies (see Huber 
2004: 53). HDC itself lacked the neces-
sary skills to neutralize the non-
cohesiveness of the GoI and this way 
to help achieving progress in the pea-
ce talks (see ibid: 51).  
Although the level of influence on 
the mediation process remains questi-
onable, it can be determined that the 
non-cohesiveness particularly of the 
GoI, and the lack of sufficient political 
support of the peace initiative on the 
national level contributed to the nega-
tive outcome of the mediation. 
Though a more experienced and skil-
led mediator than HDC might have 
been able to cushion this disunity of 
the party and its effects on the pro-
cess, this result in turn confirms the 
hypothesis that mediation is more 
likely to be successful the more inter-
nally cohesive and the clearer identi-
fiable the conflicting parties are. 
Aceh II: While GAM, though ha-
ving experienced some serious inter-
nal tensions following the failure of 
the COHA, stayed united and loyal to 
its Sweden-based exile leadership (see 
Aspinall 2005b: 8), the Indonesian 
side remained divided. Admittedly, 
the changes in the GoI’s leadership in 
2004, when Susilo Bambang Yudhoy-
ono replaced president Megawati and 
Jusuf Kalla became vice president, set 
the example that the hardliner front 
within the GoI had lost influence (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 31). Nevertheless, 
many high ranking members of the 
central GoI as well as security officials 
were not open-minded towards bar-
gaining, but stuck to a “no-
compromise-strategy” (see Aspinall 
2005b: 9) and rather expected GAM to 
eventually accept the government’s 
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offer relating to the “Special Autono-
my Law“ (see Aspinall 2005a: 32). 
Also the TNI still opposed negotiati-
ons, though in public most of its per-
sonnel stressed its willingness to act 
in ways consistent with the GoI’s or-
ders. The provincial government of 
Aceh again partly supported the mili-
tary hardliner approach, while others 
favoured a peaceful solution to the 
conflict (see Aspinall 2005b: 10f.). 
However, despite the inner disuni-
ty of the Indonesian side, this media-
tion process led to a successful out-
come. This development seems to be 
related to the election of Yodhoyono 
and Kalla, which had shifted the ba-
lance within the GoI to the advantage 
of those defending and favouring 
peaceful negotiations (see Aspinall 
2005a: 37). This new government has 
been able to exercise some level of 
control over the TNI and to hold a 
strong position to carry out its peace 
promoting policy (see Sukma 2005: 
10). Furthermore, particularly the 
flamboyant personality of vice presi-
dent Kalla, who not only initiated the 
reopening of the peace talks, but mo-
reover as chairman of Indonesian’s 
largest party in parliament enjoyed a 
high degree of influence (see ibid), 
deserves special recognition. As a 
very charismatic and powerful figure 
in Indonesia’s political arena, he chose 
the path to energetically and publicly 
defend the peace process throughout 
the media (see Aspinall 2005a: 35f.). 
This behaviour was a remarkably new 
way of dealing with the conflict. So 
far, the non-negotiable unity of Indo-
nesia had been the only position o-
penly expressed. In addition, Kalla 
enjoyed good relationships to Islamic 
groups throughout the country, 
which enabled him even further to 
pursue Yodhoyono’s and his aim to 
reach a peaceful solution for the 
conflict (see Sukma 2005: 10). 
It remains questionable, or even 
unlikely, that the mediation efforts of 
CMI would have had succeeded had 
the former government of Megawati 
stayed in power (see Aspinall 2005a: 
37). This leads to the conclusion that 
the successful outcome of the media-
tion process in spite of the inner disu-
nity of Indonesia was not achieved 
because of its less disrupting impact, 
but rather because of the unpredic-
table variable of a political change 
and of a powerful leading figure gai-
ning influence. Consequently, it can 
be determined that mediation still 
appears more likely to be successful 
the more inwardly cohesive the par-
ties are. 
 
Hypothesis 6: It has further been hypothe-
sized that mediation in intrastate conflicts 
is more likely to be successful, the more 
the parties to the conflict realize their 
sense of weakness as a result of the unreli-
ability of outside powers´ help. 
Aceh I: This hypothesis cannot rea-
dily be answered for the Aceh I case. 
Due to the information available it 
cannot be concluded that the parties 
in the Aceh conflict had to rely on 
outside powers in a classical sense. 
Aceh II: Contrary to that, after the 
tsunami catastrophe in December 
2004, Aceh suddenly received an e-
normous international attention and 
support in a “powerful humanitarian 
context” (Sukma 2005: 9) accompa-
nied by unexpected worldwide com-
passion and sympathy (see Aspinall 
2005a: 19ff). This factor appears to 
have fostered the parties’ decision to 
reopen the peace talks; though first 
steps in this direction had already 
been taken predated to that event (see 
ICG 2005: 1). After the experience of 
the failure of the COHA, when GAM 
had again lost any international rec-
ognition, it was now desperate to re-
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engage the international community 
(see Aspinall 2005a: 27, 57). 
This motivation has further been 
driven by the expectations from the 
Acehnese civil society and the need to 
receive ongoing emergency relief, 
reconstruction support as well as do-
nor funding from the international 
community. The GoI was also aware 
of the fact that ongoing fighting 
would endanger the international 
relief efforts (see Sukma 2005: 9f.). 
While increasing international efforts 
to promote a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict apparently further fos-
tered this development, the GoI later 
even accepted a stronger international 
involvement in terms of peacekeeping 
against its fear to diminish its sover-
eignty (see Aspinall 2005a: 20, 47). 
Following this, in support of this 
hypothesis it can be assumed that the 
dependence on outside power’s help 
accompanied by the realization of 
own weakness apparently advanced 
the parties’ willingness to negotiate 
and therefore contributed to the posi-
tive mediation outcome.  
Hypotheses on the characteristics 
and skills of the mediator 
Hypothesis 7: Within this third cluster of 
hypotheses, it has been contented that 
mediation in intrastate conflicts is more 
likely to be successful when the mediator 
is impartial; independent from the parties; 
acceptable to both; has the respect of all 
the parties; is credible as one with past 
success in settling disputes; has the 
knowledge and skills to deal with the 
issues; and has the required physical re-
sources. 
Aceh I: Despite being a new and re-
latively unknown NGO, HDC ne-
vertheless gained the respect and 
acceptability from the parties. 
Without any experience in mediating 
political disputes, its staff could de-
monstrate themselves as having a 
high-level of humanitarian expertise 
following the involvement in various 
UN-humanitarian missions worldwi-
de (see Aspinall/Crouch 2003: 10; 
Huber 2004: 23). Furthermore, HDC 
tried to balance this lack by bringing 
outside expert groups19 into the me-
diation process, and by seeking exter-
nal expertise, for example through the 
Carter Centre (see Huber 2004: 43). 
Besides, HDC offered the required 
physical resources by providing a 
neutral environment when talks took 
place at HDC’s headquarter in Gene-
va. This has been an important factor 
for the exile GAM leadership to ensu-
re a feeling of safety and security (see 
Schulze 2004: 44; Leary 2004: 322). 
Yet, as HDC fulfilled these conditions 
while the mediation process failed 
nevertheless, it remains questionable 
to what extent they influenced the 
outcome of the mediation. 
HDC’s status furthermore provi-
ded it with an independent and neut-
ral position in the eyes of the parties. 
Though HDC had very much a point 
of view of wanting to stop the violen-
ce (see Leary 2004: 317) and a desire 
to achieve international reputation 
(see Huber 2004: 4), it was (seen) suf-
ficiently technically neutral and im-
partial (see ibid: 4; 43; Aspi-
nall/Crouch 2003: 49). However, its 
personal partiality led HDC to an 
overestimation of its actual mediation 
abilities and its potential to guarantee 
security through the JSC during the 
                                                          
19  In 2001, HDC formed a team called the 
“wise men“, which got involved in the peace 
talks as mediators. This group consisted of the 
retired U.S. Marine General Anthony Zinni, 
former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuan, the 
former Yugoslav ambassador to Indonesia, 
Budimir Loncar, and the former Swedish dip-
lomat Bengt Soderberg (see Aspinall/Crouch 
2003: 27; Huber 2004: 27).  
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implementation phase of the COHA 
(see Huber 2004: 35). HDC’s motivati-
on towards international recognition 
made it quite dependant on the GoI, 
on which it had less influence than on 
GAM (see ibid: 59). Without being 
able to address the level of influence 
on the mediation outcome, it can be 
assumed that HDC’s lack of personal 
impartiality might have had at least 
some impact on decisions it took out 
of its ambition, which contributed to 
the failure of the mediation. This 
leads to the reverse assumption that 
mediation might be more likely to be 
successful when the mediator is im-
partial. 
Besides that, HDC lacked the cul-
tural knowledge and skills concerning 
the region and its people. Therefore, it 
was more difficult for it to address 
and understand the root causes and 
underlying obstacles of the conflict as 
well as the main concerns of the 
conflicting parties. HDC clearly over-
came this handicap throughout the 
years of its involvement in Aceh (see 
ibid: 43) especially by creating a cul-
turally mixed team of international as 
well as Acehnese staff (see ibid: 11). 
Nevertheless, for example by not suf-
ficiently diagnosing and understan-
ding the motivation and underlying 
aims of both parties and the abilities 
of spoilers in undermining the peace 
process, HDC simply missed being a 
“reflective practitioner” (see ibid: 40). 
Though this lack of cultural knowled-
ge and understanding might not have 
had a strong impact on the negotiati-
ons in terms of reaching an agree-
ment, in any case it influenced the 
breakdown of the COHA. Therefore, 
it had a strong negative impact on the 
failure of the mediation process, 
which in turn supports this hypothe-
sis. 
Aceh II: As most of these characte-
ristics have been displayed by CMI, 
the Aceh II case supports this hypo-
thesis. CMI, and in particular Martii 
Ahtisaari, who took over the main 
mediator’s role in the Aceh II process, 
received a high degree of respect and 
acceptability from the parties. Due to 
his previous involvement in various 
peace processes and to his work as a 
diplomat as well as for the United 
Nations (UN), Ahtisaari enjoyed a 
high reputation and status providing 
him with a high level of credibility 
(see Aspinall 2005a: 19). 
However, while being a neutral 
outsider entering the dispute, CMI 
did not completely stick to an impar-
tial role but rather partly took over 
the position of the GoI, which had 
made unquestionably clear that it 
would only further negotiate to reach 
a final settlement on the basis of the 
still existing Special Autonomy Law 
(see ibid: 23). As stated by a CMI 
member, “the general aim of the ne-
gotiations was to establish a process 
leading to a peaceful settlement of the 
Aceh conflict within the framework of 
autonomy” (see Arola 2005). 
While Ahtisaari did not want to 
ask the rebels to give up on their 
claim for independence in the begin-
ning of the negotiations, he was aware 
of the GoI’s non-negotiable position in 
terms of Indonesia’s integrity (see 
ibid: 23), which meant that peace had 
to be built on an agreement that was 
based on some form of autonomy for 
Aceh integrated in Indonesia. While 
the GoI exerted pressure on GAM by 
threatening it with further military 
operations, the CMI team and in par-
ticular Ahtisaari later in the process 
followed and occasionally actively 
supported the irrevocable position of  
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the government. At that stage, he 
apparently stepped back from his 
even technically impartial stance not 
to lose the negotiations by repeatedly 
mentioning that a resolution of the 
conflict would only be possible if 
being based on some sort of special 
autonomy. This way he made un-
doubtedly clear that GAM’s original 
goal of achieving Aceh’s independen-
ce would never be achievable. 
Through his strategy “nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed” he 
further aimed at fostering the rebels 
to examine the autonomy option (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 25).20 
Besides that, the pressure on GAM 
further increased through the interna-
tional involvement of various ambas-
sadors and diplomats trying to con-
vince the GAM negotiators of a solu-
tion respecting Indonesia’s territorial 
integrity. Although within GAM’s 
lines voices became more frequent 
which criticized CMI’s position, GAM 
did not leave the process but rather 
finally declared its willingness to ac-
                                                          
20  According to Meeri-Maria Jaarva from 
CMI, ”no ceasefire before a political solution 
was not something Ahtisaari and CMI imposed 
or even suggested, but rather something that 
the GoI had as their bottom line and we had to 
accept. „ Nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed" was not really related to that. It was 
first of all a media strategy, preventing parties 
to claim victories in front of their own constitu-
encies when the process was still ongoing. 
Secondly, it related to the issue of autonomy 
and independence. While GAM did during the 
talks announce that they will let go of their 
claim for independence, this was not our aim. 
Ahtisaari's thinking was rather that while 
independence was not on the table in the nego-
tiations, because he felt it is an unrealistic aim 
when no part of the international community 
supported it, he did not demand the GAM to 
accept autonomy during the negotiations. 
Nothing being agreed before everything was 
agreed, GAM could see the "whole package", 
for instance what the GoI would offer inside the 
framework of autonomy, and then decide if 
that was enough for them to give up independ-
ence” (Email exchange of October 5, 2006). 
cept a solution based on “self-
government” (see ibid: 25f.).  
Despite the “technical partiality” 
of CMI on this issue, the mediation 
process was successful. This result 
raises the question of the actual im-
portance and impact of a mediator’s 
complete impartiality on the outcome 
of a mediation process, and in turn, of 
possible contributions of (subtle) par-
tiality in deadlock situations. It ap-
pears that the – at least temporarily – 
“technical partiality” of CMI contribu-
ted to the successful outcome of the 
mediation, though it remains questio-
nable how much the “capitulation” of 
GAM might have further been in-
fluenced by other factors and cir-
cumstances at that stage of the 
conflict. However, the Aceh II case 
suggests that complete impartiality 
might not be necessary to achieve a 
positive outcome of the mediation 
and therefore does not support the 
hypothesis that mediation is more 
likely to be successful when the medi-
ator is impartial. 
 
Hypothesis 8: In this context, it has fur-
ther been argued that mediation in intra-
state conflicts is more likely to be success-
ful when the intermediary has a certain 
amount of leverage, be it moral or mate-
rial, although the amount of leverage may 
not have to be very great. 
Aceh I: HDC as a nongovernmental 
organization with a low profile clearly 
lacked the kind of leverage states or 
international bodies can use to put a 
certain amount of pressure on the 
parties when necessary (see Aspi-
nall/Crouch 2003: 49). Besides that, 
during the different phases of its in-
volvement, HDC did not use its prob-
able main source of leverage, namely 
the threat to withdraw itself from the 
peace talks (see Huber 2004: 71), but 
various other forms to exert influence 
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on the parties and to keep the negotia-
tions under control. 
As GAM desperately aimed at re-
ceiving international recognition and 
legitimacy (see Aspinall 2005a: 59), 
and the GoI realized a chance to im-
prove Indonesia’s negative internati-
onal image due to the East Timor 
crisis (see Huber 2004: 19), solely the 
fact of HDC’s involvement provided 
it with some sort of moral or legitima-
te leverage, which it could use as a 
“carrot” (see Schulze 2004: 51ff.). 
However, in view of the fact that the 
mediation process failed, the possible 
influence of this sort of leverage on a 
mediation outcome can hardly be 
examined. 
Occasionally, HDC was also ca-
pable of exerting some kind of “politi-
cal leverage” following a great sup-
port its initiative received from vari-
ous states, demonstrated through 
well-publicized visits of US- and EU-
ambassadors throughout 2001/2002 
(see ibid: 27). Besides that, HDC bor-
rowed political and expertise leverage 
through the involvement of an outsi-
de experts group21 and the “wise 
men”.22 This way, HDC tried to create 
broader interest in a successful peace 
process and to have major power 
states clearly show their interest in the 
conflict’s outcome (see Kay 2002/2003: 
8). Then, during the negotiations lead-
ing to the signing of the COHA, HDC 
arranged a meeting between six Aceh-
nese society leaders and GAM nego-
                                                          
21  This team consisted of the conflict resolu-
tion specialist William Ury, the international 
lawyer Hurst Hannum, a member of the British 
House of Lords, and the human rights advocate 
Eric (Lord) Avebury (see Huber 2004: 27). 
22  The wise men acted as observers to the 
talks by participating in the negotiations and 
offering advice to the process. The process 
profited especially from this group’s high 
political as well as media profile and their 
obvious linkages to important countries (see 
Huber 2004: 27f.). 
tiators that is said to have convinced 
GAM to stick to the peace talks (see 
Reid 2004: 30; Huber 2004: 30). 
Although HDC had some moral 
leverage and had been able to borrow 
political and expertise leverage from 
other actors, the mediation process 
finally failed. Its own power was so 
limited that HDC during the negotia-
tion phase was not able to significant-
ly influence or lead the parties and to 
keep their actions in line of the peace 
process. Besides that, HDC did not 
have the necessary influence to get the 
Aceh civil society sufficiently invol-
ved in the process (see Huber 2004: 
57). This might have put more pressu-
re on the belligerents to concentrate 
on a peaceful solution of the conflict 
(see ibid: 3) and could have broade-
ned the internal support for the later 
implementation of and adherence to 
the COHA. Though this had been one 
of its initial main aims, HDC saw 
itself confronted with both GAM’s 
and the GoI’s reservations towards 
this approach (see ibid: 58f.).  
HDC’s main deficiency has obvi-
ously been the lack of sufficient politi-
cal backing and international support, 
probably due to its low profile status. 
This became especially obvious du-
ring the later implementation phase of 
the COHA (see ibid: 38, 70). When 
violence finally escalated in 
March/April 2003, HDC and the JSC 
did not have the ability to counter the 
violations of the COHA due to the 
latter’s weak structure (see Reid 2004: 
313). Though HDC received at least 
financial backing from the United 
States of America (US), the EU, Nor-
way, and the World Bank (see Huber 
2004: ix; Sukma 2004: 20), which pro-
vided it with some “carrots” to offer 
(see Schulze 2004: 44), in the end these 
donor countries were not willing to 
take over direct responsibility for the 
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peace process. Furthermore, HDC 
especially lacked the contact to the 
UN and in particular to the Security 
Council and authoritative member 
states. These solely could have had 
the power to punish violating actions 
of the parties or to use “carrot and 
sticks” to exert influence (see Huber 
2004: 38). 
This lack of sufficient international 
support and therefore leverage has 
presumably been one factor contribu-
ting to the failure of the mediation 
process. Though the leverage HDC 
did have was obviously sufficient to 
lead the mediation process to the 
signing of an agreement, it was appa-
rently not enough for achieving a 
successful mediation outcome by 
reaching a durable agreement and 
prevention of violence. While it is 
impossible to indicate the level of 
influence a higher degree of leverage 
might have had on the HDC process, 
the Aceh I case suggests that some 
sort of moral and low-level expertise 
and political leverage clearly does not 
appear to be sufficient but a higher 
degree of it might be required. 
Aceh II: In contrast to that, due to 
his political history, Ahtisaari brought 
a greater degree of authority and le-
verage to the mediation process than 
HDC (see Aspinall 2005a: 19). In fact, 
he seems to have had some sort of 
“track-one leverage” “covered” in a 
track-two context by now being a 
non-governmental actor. 
Through his connections and close 
relations to high political personnel in 
the international arena (see ibid: 19), 
Ahtisaari received the necessary in-
ternational support and backing pro-
viding him with a higher degree of 
“political leverage”. This is said to 
have been of particular importance in 
the first rounds of the talks when 
GAM needed to be convinced to even-
tually step back from its independen-
ce claim. Foreign ambassadors who 
started intervening in the process 
exerted political leverage by repeated-
ly pointing out to GAM that the only 
possible solution of the conflict would 
need to be built on autonomy respec-
ting Indonesian’s territorial integrity 
(see ibid: 23, 25). Moreover, following 
the tsunami catastrophe, various poli-
tical leaders promoted the achieve-
ment of a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict (see ibid: 20). This interna-
tional support and political backing 
which had some “carrot and sticks” 
effect (see ibid: 19) has proven itself as 
invaluable at decisive phases of the 
mediation process and apparently 
contributed to GAM’s withdrawal 
from its independence claim. 
Besides other factors having in-
fluenced the process it appears rather 
unlikely that a mediator with less 
political leverage and backing could 
have led the parties to a successful 
outcome of the mediation. Conse-
quently, this hypothesis can be ans-
wered in the affirmative, though just 
moral leverage does not seem to be 
sufficient. 
 
Hypothesis 9: It has further been assumed 
that mediation in intrastate conflicts is 
more likely to be successful when the 
mediator satisfies a substantial package of 
knowledge and skills. 
Aceh I: At the beginning of its in-
volvement in Aceh, though HDC 
lacked any knowledge and skills in 
mediating political disputes, it had 
some experience in negotiations. Ho-
wever, it can be generally said that 
HDC’s choice of a “humanitarian 
mediation” approach and its changing 
strategies during the process were led 
by “entrepreneurship, improvisation, 
and learning through trial and error” 
(Huber 2004: 41). On the one hand, 
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HDC overcame its insufficient media-
tion experience by hiring the outside 
experts as support for the dialogue 
rounds (see hypothesis 8) and by see-
king advice, for example from the 
Carter Centre (see hypothesis 7). Ne-
vertheless, it was incapable of buil-
ding sufficient trust between the bel-
ligerents (see Aspinall/Crouch 2003: 
49; Huber 2004: 43, 71) and missed the 
opportunities given to an experienced 
mediator to influence the parties and 
shape the choice of issues in conflict 
to discuss during negotiations (see 
Huber 2004: 45f.). Due to its lack of 
mediation experience, in some situa-
tions HDC was simply inattentive, or 
not able to adequately deal with 
either national-level (see ibid: 54) or 
upcoming conflict dynamics, such as 
the danger of spoiling activities. Here 
HDC clearly lacked the skills to 
implement strategies how to most 
efficiently come up against these is-
sues (see ibid: 40). These failures seem 
to have strongly influenced the nega-
tive outcome of the mediation pro-
cess. Without knowing how the proc-
ess might have developed had it been 
led by a better skilled mediator, in the 
supportive of this hypothesis it can be 
concluded that a mediator fulfilling a 
substantive package of skills required 
for such a task increases the potential 
to achieve a successful mediation 
outcome. 
Aceh II: Due to his previous invol-
vement in other conflicts (see Aspinall 
2005a: 19), Ahtisaari brought suffi-
cient experience and skills to the ne-
gotiations. CMI presented its profes-
sionalism by a detailed in-depth study 
of the conflict as well as of the media-
tion process led by HDC prior to its 
intervention. This was accompanied 
by the consultation of participants of 
these earlier peace talks (see ICG 2005: 
6). This way, Ahtisaari and his team 
got an impression about the crux and 
weaknesses of the earlier processes 
and the COHA. One apparent advan-
tage of CMI was the possibility to 
analyse the failure of HDC’s previous 
mediation attempts not to repeat the 
same mistakes (see Aspinall 2005a: 
66). Therefore, CMI profited from 
these earlier lessons learned (see 
Arola 2005). Ahtisaari apparently 
followed a somewhat directive media-
tion strategy by partly giving up on 
his impartial stance in the first rounds 
of the negotiations backing the view-
point of the GoI, which he further 
combined with a more “creative tac-
tic” by insisting on his formula. He 
then managed to break deadlocks and 
to foster consensus and compromises 
at difficult discussion points during 
the process (see ibid).  
Due to his expertise (leverage), 
with the MoU Ahtisaari also reached 
the signing of a much more complex, 
detailed and thus robust agreement 
(see Aspinall 2005a: 42). By consistent-
ly insisting on his formula he forced 
the parties to think creatively and to 
find compromises on the issues divi-
ding them (see ibid: 22f.). Believing 
himself that the working field of 
NGOs ends when touching the moni-
toring area, he then managed to con-
vince the parties to accept a much 
stronger monitoring mechanism. 
Knowing that the “UN would not be 
accepted because GoI saw Aceh as an 
internal affair” (see as quoted in ibid: 
47), he proposed ASEAN and in a 
second step the EU as two regional 
organizations. In contrast to the 
COHA, which lacked the necessary 
political authority to guarantee its 
implementation, the MoU became “a 
direct buy-in by important states” 
(ibid: 46). 
Following this, it appears un-
questionable that the skills and know-
ledge of CMI and Ahtisaari in particu-
Barbara Kemper 
 
32 
lar contributed highly to the success-
ful outcome of the mediation process. 
Therefore, the Aceh II case supports 
this hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 10: It has also been hypothe-
sized that the sooner the mediator becomes 
involved in the conflict instead of waiting 
on the outside for the appropriate time, 
and by trial and error, regulates his or her 
activities according to the opportunities 
and constraints of the situation, the more 
likely is the mediation to succeed. 
Aceh I: In 1999, HDC decided to try 
getting involved in the Aceh conflict 
due to the worldwide spreading ru-
mours that Indonesia would possibly 
break up. Though it was not focussed 
on Aceh in the first place, it decided 
in its favour because of the long dura-
tion of this violent conflict, Aceh’s 
strategic position as well as the possi-
bility to work with the GAM leaders-
hip in exile (see Huber 2004: 20). 
Furthermore, its involvement happe-
ned at a time when Indonesia was 
experiencing changes in the political 
system following the breakdown of 
the authoritarian Suharto regime (see 
ibid: viii). However, it is assumed that 
its involvement and later staying in 
the conflict did not result from calcu-
lation but rather happened fortuitous-
ly (see ibid; Reid 2004: 311). 
Nevertheless, though HDC acted 
as hypothesized, the mediation pro-
cess failed. Consequently, it neither 
appears that the way HDC got invol-
ved in the conflict had an essential 
impact on the outcome of the media-
tion nor can this be neglected. There-
fore, the HDC intervention does not 
provide any clear argument pro or 
contra this hypothesis. 
Aceh II: The first initiative to resu-
me negotiation talks between GAM 
and the GoI came from vice president 
Kalla already in early 2004. Kalla cho-
se two different tracks to get into con-
tact with GAM to test out the situati-
on: on the one hand, he used trusted 
intermediaries, who contacted GAM’s 
field commanders. Secondly, he loo-
ked for ways to reach GAM’s leaders-
hip in Sweden (see Aspinall 2005a: 16; 
ICG 2005: 2ff.).23 Only during the se-
cond step, Juha Christensen, a Finnish 
businessperson, approached Martii 
Ahtisaari to act as the mediator (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 18). As Ahtisaari did 
not introduce himself as a possible 
intermediary, this case does not give 
the necessary input to respond to the 
hypothesis, when and how a mediator 
should best intervene into a conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 11: It has further been sug-
gested that mediation in intrastate con-
flicts is more likely to be successful when 
the mediator is assumed to belong to an 
international nongovernmental, non-
political organisation. 
Aceh I: Right from the very begin-
ning, the GoI as well as the Indone-
sian military elite strongly rejected 
any high-profile international in-
volvement by international bodies 
such as the UN. Even though the US, 
Japan, the EU as well as the World 
Bank supported the peace negotia-
tions by partly financing HDC, this 
influence from international side was 
unofficial and invisible. Therefore, it 
does not seem to have had a strong 
impact on the process (see Aspi-
nall/Crouch 2003: 50). HDC precisely 
took advantage of its status as an in-
ternational nongovernmental and 
non-political organization, as its in-
volvement did not threaten the GoI’s 
                                                          
23  For contacting GAM’s commanders in the 
field, Kalla used the services of track-two ac-
tors, in concrete of businesspersons with con-
nections to GAM (see Aspinall 2005a: 16ff; ICG 
2005: 2ff.).  
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sovereignty (see Kay 2002/2003: 8; 
Leary 2004: 323). This is further pro-
ven by the fact that the GoI itself en-
couraged HDC in August 2000 to take 
over the mediator’s position to lead 
the political dialogue between the 
belligerents (see Huber 2004: 41). As 
the GoI would have never accepted a 
track-one actor as mediator, even 
though the mediation process did not 
result in a successful outcome, this 
hypothesis is supported by the Aceh 
case. 
Aceh II: Even after the tsunami, the 
GoI still clearly regarded the Aceh 
conflict as an internal affair (see Aspi-
nall 2005a: 47). By choosing again a 
small NGO instead of a governmental 
body as mediator, the GoI could still 
publicly argue that the conflict was 
neither going to be internationalised 
(see ibid: 19) nor that it was going to 
foster providing GAM with legitima-
cy. Thus, any more official support 
could have been counterproductive to 
the negotiations. It can be concluded 
that the GoI would have never accep-
ted any international governmental 
body but merely a track-two actor as 
mediator. Therefore, it appears that 
not only the assumption, but also the 
fact that the mediator belonged to a 
nongovernmental organization con-
sequently contributed to the positive 
mediation outcome. 
 
Hypothesis 12: The last hypothesis dis-
cussed suggests that mediation in intra-
state conflicts is more likely to be success-
ful when without endangering the neutral 
position of the mediator a non-visible 
empowerment of the weaker conflicting 
party increases her bargaining potential. 
Aceh I: During the whole process, 
HDC somehow tried to equalize the 
parties’ power in negotiation. Begin-
ning already in the pre-negotiation 
phase, among the group of outside 
experts HDC invited Lord Eric Ave-
bury, a member of the British House 
and a human rights advocate, to join 
the talks. Avebury had been a long-
time friend to GAM and was trusted 
by its founder Hasan di Tiro (Leary 
2004: 319). His task was to support 
and reassure GAM that HDC’s inten-
tion was positive, and to be its advo-
cate (Huber 2004: 27). 
Through the involvement of the 
“wise men” in the negotiation phase 
in mid-2001, GAM as the less expe-
rienced party also received support in 
formulating and advocating its positi-
on (see ibid). This way, GAM was 
empowered to increase its bargaining 
potential. On the other hand, the ou-
ter experts emphasized to GAM that it 
would not receive any international 
support for its independence claim on 
Aceh. At the same time, they stressed 
towards the GoI that the international 
community was supporting Indone-
sia’s integrity (see ibid). The fact that 
this strategy did not endanger the 
neutral role of HDC as mediator 
might be explained by HDC’s tactic to 
“use” outsider parties to take over 
this (biased) role. However, though it 
has been argued that GAM clearly 
valued the involvement of these ex-
perts (see ibid), it cannot be determi-
ned if, and to what extend particular-
ly the empowerment of GAM influen-
ced the process. Therefore, if, and to 
what degree a connection may be 
established to the outcome of the me-
diation process remains questionable. 
Aceh II: This case does not provide 
a clear answer to the hypothesis. As 
far as information is provided, GAM 
had the support of a political advisor, 
Damien Kingsbury, who accompa-
nied the rebels during this new pro-
cess and while adopting their new 
policy to step back from their inde-
pendence claim (see Aspinall 2005a: 
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26). Furthermore, according to Meeri-
Maria Jaarva from CMI, “GAM was 
receiving support for their negotiation 
tactics, agenda formulation and con-
sultation with wider community from 
the Swedish Olof Palme Center. We 
were in contact with them, but did not 
participate” (Email exchange of Octo-
ber 5, 2006). Even so, with regard to 
the partly biased position the media-
tor team took over in favour of GoI, 
the effect of this empowerment so-
mewhat remains questionable, espe-
cially as pressure had apparently been 
exerted on GAM to step back from its 
independence claim (see Aspinall 
2005a: 25). Following this, though the 
mediation led to a successful outco-
me, this hypothesis cannot be answe-
red in certainty. 
In this chapter, Assefa’s hypothe-
ses have been tested on two mediati-
on processes of both success and fai-
lure having been conducted by HDC 
and CMI in Aceh to identify the vali-
dity of their conditions towards the 
respective mediation outcome. As the 
previous analysis shows, while the 
two Aceh processes support some of 
Assefa’s hypotheses, they refute o-
thers. In addition to that, some of 
these especially with regard to the 
Aceh I case could not clearly be affir-
med without reservations. External 
unpredictable and uncontrollable 
factors due to new conflict dynamics 
have apparently further influenced 
the independent variables by shaping 
the outcome of the mediation proces-
ses. In the second Aceh case, such 
factors have been a change in both 
parties’ leadership, new political dy-
namics within the Indonesian party, 
the tsunami catastrophe, and in this 
context the opening of Aceh to the 
international world (see Sukma 2005: 
9). 
3.2 Analyzing Similarities and 
Differences 
To identify these conditions, which 
appear to have been the most crucial 
ones for the positive mediation out-
come in the Aceh II case, this section 
will focus on the key differences be-
tween the two processes. In particu-
lar, those conditions will be exami-
ned, which were fulfilled in the suc-
cessful case in contrast to the failed 
HDC mediation. That is, because ge-
nerally it is what sets these mediation 
processes apart that seems to have 
been decisive in shaping their diffe-
rent outcomes. However, in this con-
text, the occurrence of unpredictable 
variables due to changing conflict 
dynamics (see above) must be care-
fully taken into account. 
Similarities of the Aceh cases 
Referring to similarities in relation to 
the nature and characteristics of the con-
flict, due to the marginal time differ-
ence between the failed mediation 
attempt by HDC in 2003 and the re-
opening of negotiations in early 2005, 
the mere duration of the Aceh conflict 
(see hypothesis 1) could not be seen as 
having had any influence on the me-
diation outcome. At least, the possible 
positive influence of the time factor is 
probably insignificant. 
Besides that, in both processes the 
number and dimension of issues under 
contention were many and intricate 
(see hypothesis 4). In contrast to the 
failed HDC process, during the nego-
tiations leading to the MoU these had 
already been addressed in terms of 
content. Following this, it was not the 
mere existence of the multiplicity and 
multidimensionality of the issues in con-
flict, but their salience during the  
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negotiations and their inclusion in the 
MoU that contributed to the positive 
outcome of the CMI process. Compar-
ing the cases, this apparently de-
pended on how and when these multi-
ple issues were included in the nego-
tiations as well as on the willingness 
of the parties (see Aspinall 2005a: 23). 
During the CMI process, the in-
volvement of a high number and di-
mension of issues under contention 
apparently provided the ground for 
further bargaining accompanied by 
compromise and incentives, which 
ended in the signing of a much more 
extensive peace agreement presu-
mably having fostered the parties’ 
willingness to stick to it. While in 
relation to the HDC process the pos-
sible positive influence of such a stra-
tegy remained questionable (see Aspi-
nall/Crouch 2003: 47), the analysis of 
the successful CMI mediation leads to 
the conclusion that at the right time 
this factor, in conjunction with others, 
has been important. However, it ap-
parently has not been of crucial influ-
ence, as it presents itself as being too 
strongly dependent on the interactiv-
ity of other factors. 
The similar characteristics of the me-
diators, in both cases were: a) the in-
dependence from the parties, b) being 
acceptable to both, c) having the 
disputants’ respect, as well as d) 
being able to offer the required physi-
cal resources (see hypothesis 7). While 
the rank of influence of these factors 
in comparison to others can hardly be 
assessed, it can be said that these ap-
pear as basic conditions that have had 
a positive and strong influence on the 
mediation outcome. In particular the 
possibility to offer the required physi-
cal resources in this context is most 
notable as it offered the exiled lea-
dership of GAM safety and security to 
attend the negotiations (see Schulze 
2004: 44; Leary 2004: 322). 
A further factor has been the as-
sumption, indeed the fact, of the medi-
ators belonging to a nongovernmental, 
non-political body (see hypothesis 11). 
For the Aceh process, this factor is 
most likely to have had a strong in-
fluence on the mediation outcome 
without reservation. The GoI at the 
time of both interventions would have 
never accepted the movement of any 
international governmental body in 
the conflict (see Aspinall 2005a: 47; 
Aspinall/Crouch 2003: 50). Hence, 
though not differing between the 
cases, this factor appears to have been 
a pre-condition for getting an accep-
table outsider mediator at all involved 
in the conflict and therefore a media-
tion process eventually started. There-
fore, this factor seems to even have 
crucially fostered and influenced the 
course of the mediation process. 
Contrary to that, while in both 
processes GAM as the weaker conflic-
ting party received some sort of em-
powerment (see hypothesis 12), the 
effect of this factor on the mediation 
outcome remained questionable in 
both cases. 
Differences between the Aceh cases 
Apart from these similarities, it is 
what sets the two mediation processes 
apart that – keeping in mind the in-
fluence of unpredictable variables – 
seems to be most decisive for the dif-
ferent outcomes of the two cases. In 
this context, two conditions can clear-
ly be ruled out, which apparently had 
not been fulfilled in the success case 
and therefore had no impact on the 
mediation outcome. 
Firstly, the mediator had not cho-
sen to get involved in the conflict (see 
hypothesis 10), but Ahtisaari had been 
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approached as mediator by use of 
unofficial track-two diplomacy.24 Se-
condly, while HDC as the mediator 
remained at least technically impartial 
(see hypothesis 7), Ahtisaari and his 
CMI team in relation to GAM’s inde-
pendence claim partly gave up on 
their impartial stance to the advanta-
ge of the GoI (see Aspinall 2005a: 23). 
Referring to those factors, which 
contrary to HDC’s intervention were 
present in the CMI process and there-
fore seem to have been the most cru-
cial conditions having influenced the 
positive outcome of the process, in 
relation to the nature and characteristics 
of the conflict, first that has been 
GAM’s withdrawal from its indepen-
dence claim (see hypothesis 4). In 
contrast to the HDC process, when 
such a move of GAM had not even 
been open for consideration (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 4; Huber 2004: 30), 
during the CMI intervention GAM 
finally stepped back from that aim 
(see Panontongan 2005). This move of 
GAM led to a major breakthrough in 
the negotiations (see Aspinall 2005a: 
26), which paved the way for further 
bargaining, finally ending in the 
signing of a workable peace agree-
ment still lasting today. 
Secondly, interrelated and inter-
dependent to this factor, the existence 
of the – merely one-sided – stalemate 
to the disadvantage of GAM accom-
panied by the GoI’s doubts that a 
military victory could ever be reached 
and the awareness of high and raising 
costs belongs to the apparently most 
powerful conditions for the successful 
Aceh II case (see hypothesis 2). This 
shift in the parties’ strengths, and in 
particular with regard to GAM’s wea-
kening fighting spirit, appears to have 
been a “chief factor” for the parties’ 
                                                          
24  For detailed information, please see Aspi-
nall 2005a: 16. 
willingness to return to and stay at 
the bargaining table (see Aspinall 
2005a: 57). 
In relation to the characteristics of 
the parties, another crucial factor had 
been the realization of weakness follo-
wing the tsunami catastrophe accom-
panied by the awareness that interna-
tional support might be withdrawn 
from Aceh in case of ongoing use of 
violence (see hypothesis 6). At the 
time of the HDC process, GAM had 
already desperately aimed at recei-
ving international recognition and 
legitimacy but was not dependent on 
outside powers’ help. In contrast to 
that, after the tsunami and due to the 
devastating situation in the region, 
the Acehnese clearly needed and both 
conflicting parties wanted the interna-
tional community to stay involved in 
Aceh (see ibid: 27, 57; Sukma 2005: 
10). This desire of GAM connected 
with its weaker position following the 
stalemate it faced appears to further 
have been closely related to its step-
ping back from the independence 
claim.  
In addition to that, the difference 
between the cases related to the inter-
nal disunity particularly of the Indone-
sian side (see hypothesis 5) presents 
another most crucial factor. The actual 
condition – a natural internal cohesive-
ness – was not fulfilled on the Indone-
sian side in both cases. During HDC’s 
intervention, this led to spoiling acti-
vities, which had a crucial impact on 
the breakdown of the COHA (see 
Panontongan 2005; Huber 2004: 22). 
Contrary to that, at the time of CMI’s 
intervention, Vice-President Kalla as a 
charismatic and powerful politician 
by way of his status and peace-
promoting interaction in combination 
with a strong peace fostering go-
vernment (see Aspinall 2005a: 35ff.; 
Sukma 2005: 10) achieved building an 
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atmosphere within Indonesia’s lines, 
which might be described as some 
sort of “artificial unity”. As it is doub-
ted that the CMI mediation process 
would have succeeded had Megawa-
ti’s government remained in power, 
this “artificial unity” in contrast to the 
HDC process had a decisive influence 
on the successful mediation process. 
Finally, referring to the characte-
ristics and skills of the mediator, the 
obviously crucial factors having most 
likely contributed to the success of the 
Aceh II case have been the question of 
leverage of the mediator (see hypothe-
sis 8), of his (im) partiality (hypothesis 
7) and the mediator’s expertise and 
skills (see hypothesis 9). In both cases, 
the mediators had some leverage. 
However, the difference to be drawn 
relates to the degree and kind of leve-
rage. While both mediators provided 
moral or legitimate leverage through 
their intervention, a clear and crucial 
distinction has to be made in relation 
to their political leverage as well as 
their expertise.  
The “political leverage” factor has 
apparently most powerfully worked 
out in favour of the successful outco-
me of the CMI process. This condition 
seems to be strongly dependent on 
and interrelated with the international 
support a mediator achieves, which 
again highly depends on the interna-
tional status the mediator enjoys. 
HDC as an unknown NGO was defi-
cient in all these respects and just 
occasionally could borrow political 
leverage. CMI and in particular Ahti-
saari in contrast brought a high level 
of political authority to the process 
due to Ahtisaari’s own former politi-
cal status and his connections to in-
fluential people in the international 
arena (see Aspinall 2005a: 19). Unlike 
HDC, this “political leverage” obvi-
ously allowed Ahtisaari to lead the 
mediation in a more directive manner 
by partly taking over a rather biased 
position, and to exert influence on 
GAM to accept a solution based on 
autonomy. In this context, Ahtisaari 
also received the necessary support of 
the international community, for e-
xample through the intervention of 
foreign ambassadors. 
Contrary to HDC, CMI and parti-
cularly Ahtisaari partly took over a 
rather partial role in support of the 
GoI. This “technical partiality” and 
the degree of (political) leverage Ahti-
saari could bring to the process ap-
pear to have been a key combination 
to exert the necessary influence on 
GAM to break the deadlock. On the 
other hand, also during the HDC pro-
cess it had already been tried to in-
fluence GAM through the involve-
ment of outside experts (see Huber 
2004: 27). However, in the HDC case 
such international support as was 
given was rather of an informal na-
ture and especially lacking with re-
gard to the implementation of the 
COHA (see ibid: 38). During CMI’s 
intervention again, international sup-
port and backing seem to have been 
much more on stage, closely related to 
the international recognition Aceh 
received following the tsunami ca-
tastrophe. Seemingly that stronger 
political backing and international 
support provided CMI with much 
more political leverage, making a 
crucial difference. 
With regard to the mediator’s 
knowledge and skills, HDC had hard-
ly any mediation expertise, but had to 
borrow this expertise (see Huber 2004: 
27) through the involvement of outsi-
de experts. Ahtisaari again could offer 
his own expertise due to his working 
history and past involvement in poli-
tical negotiations (see Aspinall 2005a: 
19). According to his experiences and 
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by obviously choosing the right stra-
tegy, he had the ability to manage and 
creatively influence the process and 
the parties immensely and achieved 
the creation of a much more robust 
peace agreement. Furthermore, the 
combination of political leverage and 
expertise of CMI enabled it to bring in 
and convince the parties to accept a 
much stronger monitoring mecha-
nism to guarantee the later implemen-
tation and adherence of the MoU (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 42, 4.). This had been 
a deficiency in the first mediation 
process (see Panontongan 2005; Hu-
ber 2004: 22), which had strongly in-
fluenced its failure. Although CMI 
also profited from HDC’s previous 
efforts in Aceh (see Arola 2005), the 
mediators’ skills and knowledge and the 
expertise leverage a mediator can 
further use resulting out of these 
clearly differed decisively between 
the cases. However, it has to be borne 
in mind that particularly the new and 
weakened position of GAM as well as 
the new conflict dynamics following 
the tsunami catastrophe played a 
decisive role. 
 
Crucial conditions derived from Assefa's hypotheses 
 
 
In this chapter, the results from 
testing the hypotheses on the two 
Aceh mediation processes have 
briefly been summarized and set in 
context to identify these conditions, 
which appear to have been most cru-
cial to the success of track-two media-
tion in an intrastate conflict. In the 
following, these will be reflected on 
the topical state of debate in the aca-
demic field on this matter. 
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4. The Results in the Context of the Present 
State of Debates 
Below, relating to the interim resume 
and the previous analysis, the empiri-
cal results from testing Assefa’s hy-
potheses on the two Aceh mediation 
processes will be discussed in terms 
of the current state of literature in 
order to illustrate how they fit into the 
present state of research. In this con-
text, it will mainly be referred to Asse-
fa’s conditions that have been identi-
fied as the most significant ones for 
the successful Aceh case and to those, 
which have received considerable 
attention in the scholarly field, but 
have not been supported by the pre-
vious analysis. In a second step, addi-
tional factors, which appear to have 
had an impact on the positive media-
tion outcome but were not encompas-
sed by Assefa’s hypotheses, will be 
presented. However, as these were 
partly covered in the discussion of 
Assefa’s hypotheses and due to the 
limitations of this study, these will 
only briefly be touched on. 
4.1 The Nature and 
Characteristics of the 
Conflict 
Relating to the nature and characteris-
tics of the conflict, the analysis of the 
Aceh case proves the general schol-
arly agreement that the point of time 
when mediation is attempted, the 
“propitious moment” (Berco-
vitch/Derouen 2004: 155) displays a 
significant factor (see Bercovitch 1997: 
145). 
The academic world seems to 
agree that as far as possible such a 
situation exists, which may be charac-
terized as “the ripe moment” for an 
intervention to be propitious. The 
“ripeness” of a conflict is said to refer 
“to both to a condition to the conflict 
and to the right time for intervention” 
(Fisher 2001: 20). In this connexion, 
some scholars argue that an interven-
tion can be seen as most promising by 
entering the dispute as soon as pos-
sible before fronts between the 
conflicting parties harden. Others 
assume that mediation can only be 
successfully applied after a “mini-
mum time period” (Kleiboer 1996, 
363; Bercovitch et al. 1991: 22), or even 
later when parties are tiring, costs are 
soaring, and mediation appears to be 
the better alternative to ongoing fight-
ing (see Hopmann 1991: 40). 
A different group of scholars re-
gards a conflict as “ripe” for interven-
tion due to the existence of unendu-
rable conditions such as a “mutual 
hurting stalemate” between the 
conflicting parties (see Zartman 2005: 
10 f.; Olson/Pearson, 2002: 441; Assefa 
1987: 195; Bercovitch 1997: 145). Ad-
vocates of this theory regard the e-
xistence of a stalemate, or at least a 
change in power relations as a 
“benchmark in a conflict” for the eva-
luation of mediation success in terms 
of a conflict’s “ripeness”. That is, be-
cause mediation always depends hea-
vily on the willingness of the parties 
to peacefully settle a conflict (see 
Zartman 2005; Touval/Zartman 2001: 
434; ibid 1985: 16; Olson/Pearson, 
2002: 441; Rubin 1992: 251; Arola 
2005). Therefore, the existence of such 
a factor is said to raise the actors’ wil-
lingness towards negotiations and 
therefore also the chances for media-
tion success. 
Referring to this scholarly debate, 
the results of the Aceh analysis sup-
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port the stalemate theory. Though the 
literature speaks about a “mutually 
hurting stalemate”, following the 
comparison of the Aceh processes the 
parties’ willingness has apparently 
been strongly fostered by even only a 
one-sided stalemate. This had been 
accompanied by GoI’s perception that 
the parties were facing an unbearable 
situation “that appears likely to be-
come very costly” (Touval/Zartman 
1985: 16). In contrast to that, an assu-
med significance of the duration of 
the conflict remained questionable. 
In addition, the results from Asse-
fa’s hypotheses dealing with the issues 
in conflict match with the current 
state of scholarly debate. The literatu-
re regards the number and complexity 
of issues under contention as an ad-
vantage for mediation, by offering the 
mediator opportunities to persuade a 
party to compromise (see Assefa 1987: 
196). Furthermore, it seemingly agrees 
that the issues in conflict and the way 
they are perceived make a difference 
in relation to the mediation outcome. 
Scholars have determined that 
intrastate conflicts dealing with issues 
of sovereignty, such as those about 
secessionism and autonomy, are less 
likely to be able to be mediated due to 
their intractability because of the 
deadlocked situation of the parties 
(see e.g. Bercovitch/Houston 1996: 24; 
Bercovitch/Derouen 2005: 111; Berco-
vitch et al. 1991: 13f.). This assumpti-
on has been proven right by the Aceh 
case study, which demonstrated clear-
ly - as long as GAM stuck to its inde-
pendence claim - that conflicts about 
such zero-sum, or “lose-all”, “win-all” 
issues in particular due to their “all-
or-nothing nature” make mediation 
extraordinary difficult (see Huber 
2004: 5). 
4.2 The Characteristics of the 
Parties 
Referring to the characteristics of the 
parties, the comparison of the two 
Aceh mediation processes shows that 
the internal disunity of conflicting par-
ties makes a clear identification of 
acceptable key people difficult for the 
mediator. Failures of a clear identifi-
cation of those can apparently lead to 
spoiling activities heavily endange-
ring the implementation of an agree-
ment. This has also been concluded 
by the scholarly field, though general-
ly in relation to interstate disputes. 
Scholars like Kressel/Pruitt (1989: 
405), Bercovitch/Houston (1996: 21), 
Assefa (1987: 13), or Ott (1972) not 
only regard internal disunity and 
quarrels within one group as disrup-
tive factors to the mediation process. 
They also especially emphasize that 
the conflicting parties need to be 
clearly definable and legitimate iden-
tities. However, following the Aceh 
case study, such disunity within a 
party does not necessarily prevent the 
signing of an agreement, but appa-
rently heavily endangers its imple-
mentation phase. 
The condition on the realization of 
weakness and dependence on external 
help apparently has not received a 
high level of attention in the academic 
field so far. However, due to the Aceh 
analysis such an (unexpected) depen-
dence on external help following an 
“event” like the tsunami catastrophe, 
and the awareness of its possible loss 
in case of ongoing fighting apparently 
may further foster strongly the wil-
lingness of the parties to achieve a 
peaceful settlement. 
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4.3 The Characteristics and 
Skills of the Mediator 
In relation to the necessary character-
istics and skills a successful mediator 
should incorporate, Ott (1972: 599) 
has named a long list of conditions 
identified as likely to be crucial for a 
successful mediation process, at least 
if a substantial combination of some 
of these resources is offered (see hy-
pothesis 7). In context to track-two 
mediation, in the academic field espe-
cially the question of leverage has gai-
ned increasing attention. Some aca-
demics even regard this factor as one 
of the most crucial ones for a success-
ful mediation outcome, or as “the 
ticket to mediation” (Touval/Zartman 
2001: 436; ibid, 1989: 129; see Crocker 
et al. 1999b: 21; Bercovitch et al. 1991: 
15; Bercovitch/Houston 1996: 26; Ber-
covitch 1997: 146). 
While the term leverage lacks an 
explicit definition, it is often set in 
context to power and influence in 
terms of using “carrots and sticks” 
(Touval/Zartman 1985: 13). High-
ranking track-one mediators are gene-
rally said to possess a much higher 
degree of leverage. They can use their 
political as well as social influence to 
persuade the conflicting parties of a 
mediation in one way or another (see 
Bercovitch 1997: 146). Contrary to 
that, track-two actors lack that same 
kind of leverage by nature of their 
status. In this context, scholars have 
defined six different types of leverage 
a mediator could use. Of these, solely 
two refer to the use of coercive power. 
The other four – generally spoken - 
rather build on the personal qualities 
and abilities of the mediator in terms 
of legitimacy and authority, relations-
hip-based influence as well as expert 
knowledge and skills (see Rubin 1992: 
256 ff.; Touval/Zartman 2001: 437 ff.). 
This development is said to create 
space for track-two actors to use a 
quite different kind of power to in-
fluence the mediation outcome (see 
Aall 2001: 375). Explicitly referring to 
the cases of Sudan (see Assefa 1987) 
and Mozambique (see Hume 1994), it 
has further been argued that a media-
tor himself must never exercise po-
wer, not to undermine his credibility 
and effectiveness (see Nathan 1999: 9, 
12). The only personal interest of a 
mediator should rather lie in achie-
ving a peaceful settlement for the 
conflict at stage (see Ott 1972: 597). 
Following the comparative analy-
sis of both Aceh mediation processes, 
some sort of moral, political and ex-
pertise leverage, the latter being based 
on the mediators’ skills, are clearly 
important sources track-two actors 
can use to exert influence on the par-
ties. With regard to HDC, these obvi-
ously can be sufficient to reach an 
agreement. This result is also read in 
the current state of scholarly debate: 
forms of “soft power” (see Aall 2001: 
374), - besides others referring to the 
legitimacy a mediator can offer the 
disputants, to his expertise and his 
relationship to the parties (see Rubin 
1992: 256 ff.; Touval/Zartman 2001: 
437 ff.) - are assumed to create space 
for mediation by track-two actors. 
However, it seems that the crux 
following the Aceh analysis is that for 
achieving a workable, solid agree-
ment and its implementation appa-
rently the degree of leverage makes a 
crucial difference. It appears that for 
mediation at the violent stage of an 
intractable conflict a higher degree of 
leverage and authority, especially 
political one following international 
support and backing, is indispensable. 
This political leverage might be exe-
cuted by external pressure, or result 
from a mediator’s own higher level of 
authority (see Aspinall 2005a: 19). 
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This result matches with the “Con-
tingency Model” of Fisher/Keashley 
(1991; 1996) in combination with 
Glasl’s (2003) “Nine Stages Escalation 
Model”, which relates the type of in-
tervention to the level of escalation of 
the conflict. This model identifies 
various types of third party interven-
tion – from good offices to peacekee-
ping - and links their usefulness and 
effectiveness to different escalation 
stages in a conflict at which they seem 
most likely applicable (see Fi-
sher/Keashley 1991; ibid 1996; Glasl 
2003). The underlying assumption of 
this model is that every conflict has its 
own dynamics consisting of interrela-
ted, interdependent and interacting 
objective as well as subjective ele-
ments influencing the conflict’s pro-
cess at all stages of its de-escalation 
and escalation (see Fisher/Keashley 
1996: 240). In relation to that model, 
the higher the escalation stage of a 
dispute, the more powerful the inter-
vention method. This approach is 
further elaborated by the so-called 
Cross-Track-Concept (see Ma-
son/Siegfried 2005: 195). In this regard 
it is argued that the effectiveness of 
conflict resolution, and therefore also 
of mediation as one of its intervention 
tools, lies in and fundamentally de-
pends on the coordination and in-
terplay of the various actors on and 
between all different levels as well as 
on their divers methods. This is called 
the “interactive conflict resolution 
approach” of these strategies (Ol-
son/Pearson 2002: 423; see Crocker et 
al. 1999b: 41). 
In this context, following the Aceh 
case also the question of neutrality and 
impartiality of a mediator, which ad-
here to the classic “Western mediation 
style” (see Moore 2003: 53; Assefa 
1987: 22), has presented itself as fur-
ther critical. Scholars have determined 
that probably no mediator can be 
completely impartial, but must be 
able to separate his personal opinion 
from the process (see Moore 2003: 54) 
to assure at least “technical impartiali-
ty” (Nathan 1999: 3). On the contrary, 
in relation to interstate conflicts it has 
even been argued that some degree of 
partiality of the mediator would raise 
the parties’ influence on him and 
could in turn increase his acceptabili-
ty. Impartiality again is assumed not 
to be decisive for the outcome of a 
mediation process (see Tou-
val/Zartman 2001: 432; ibid 1989: 121 
ff.; Bercovitch/Houston 1996: 26; Fi-
sher 2001: 20). 
Against the argumentation that a 
mediator must at least hold onto 
“technical impartiality”, in the Aceh 
case rather the at least temporarily 
partiality of CMI combined with the 
higher level of “political leverage” 
appear to have been indispensable as 
long as GAM stuck to its claim for 
independence. It further seems that 
this partiality has only been possible 
because of the mediator’s access to the 
necessary degree of leverage (see Klei-
boer 1996: 372; Reiman 2004: 44). This 
leverage Ahtisaari could provide has 
obviously been the “ticket to mediati-
on”. It allowed him to partly take over 
a rather biased position in favour of 
GoI and to exert influence on GAM in 
a more directive manner when it was 
necessary to lead the parties away 
from the deadlock situation they fa-
ced towards the breakthrough of the 
negotiations. In addition, this leverage 
seems to have been connected to the 
status and credibility of the mediator 
as well as to the international support 
he received. 
With regard to the expertise (leve-
rage) of a mediator, the literature 
regards mediative skills and know-
ledge as a most important dimension 
in mediation success. That in particu-
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lar, as a more experienced mediator is 
said to reach the signing of more solid 
and robust agreements, which again 
may foster trust and credibility bet-
ween the parties (see Berco-
vitch/Derouen 2004: 159). The Aceh 
case demonstrates clearly how a hig-
her level of mediation expertise attri-
butes to the achievement of a higher 
quality, durable settlement, which 
again raises the credibility and trust in 
the opposite party. 
4.4 Additional Factors Based on 
the Present State of the Art 
Following the analysis of the Aceh 
cases, certain factors not covered by 
Assefa’s hypotheses appear to have 
had a crucial impact on the mediation 
outcome as well. Though, due to the 
limitations of this study, these will 
only briefly be touched on. 
In relation to the nature and charac-
teristics of a conflict, this has been the 
increased intensity of the conflict at the 
time of CMI’s intervention (see hy-
pothesis 1, chapter 3.1). Due to the 
examination of the impact the conflict 
intensity has on a mediation outcome 
measured in terms of fatalities, in the 
academic field a high intensity of a 
conflict is regarded as decreasing the 
chances for mediation success (see 
Bercovitch/Derouen 2005: 108; Berco-
vitch/Houston 1996: 23f.). Contrary to 
that, it has been determined that even 
when the intensity of the conflict ra-
ther increases than decreases that 
would not prevent the signing of a 
negotiated agreement (see Assefa 
1987: 194f.). In extension to these 
views, the Aceh II case might provide 
evidence that the intensity of a 
conflict leading to a battle fatigue of 
the combatants might even contribute 
to the successful outcome of mediati-
on. 
A further factor relates to the wil-
lingness of the parties in relation to the 
initiation of the mediation process. 
While HDC initiated its involvement 
in Aceh, in contrast to that in the se-
cond case the GoI demonstrated its 
interest in reopening peace talks by 
using track-two diplomacy efforts, by 
which CMI eventually was approa-
ched as mediator (see hypothesis 10). 
Following the information available it 
has not become clear if and to what 
extent this fact might have made a 
difference between the outcomes of 
the two processes. Nevertheless, aca-
demics assume that the willingness of 
the actors demonstrated by their ini-
tiation of the mediation process 
would be a fundamental condition for 
its success (see Bercovitch/Derouen 
2005: 108; ibid 2004: 166; Ol-
son/Pearson 2002: 441; Nathan 1999: 5 
f.) and would demonstrate the parties’ 
readiness for compromise (see Rubin 
1991: 244). 
Furthermore, the international sup-
port a mediator receives and the status 
he enjoys apparently played a fun-
damental role in the Aceh case. 
Though these factors, including the 
various forms of leverage, are mainly 
discussed individually in the acade-
mic field, there is a need to regard 
them in context. It has become obvi-
ous by comparing the two processes 
that the degree of leverage a mediator 
can exert on the parties depends high-
ly on the international support and 
status he enjoys (see hypothesis 8). As 
Ahtisaari, contrary to HDC, had the 
necessary leverage due to his status 
and his therefore international sup-
port, it seems to be clear that the hig-
her the rank of the mediator, the hig-
her his international support, the hig-
her his leverage and following this the 
more likely the mediation to be suc-
cessful. This assumption is supported 
by scholars determining that “the 
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higher the mediator’s status, the grea-
ter the chances of success” (see Klei-
boer 1996: 373). Following this, the 
Aceh case also depicts the strong con-
tingency between all these conditions. 
One obvious deficiency of Assefa’s 
theory relates to the question of the 
strategy of the mediator best applied. In 
today’s academic field this factor - in 
contrast to Assefa’s theory - presents a 
fourth cluster that is regarded as a key 
component in the evaluation of medi-
ation success (see e.g. Berco-
vitch/Derouen 2004: 156; Bercovitch 
1992: 17; Touval/Zartman 1985: 11 ff.; 
Wilkenfeld et al. 2003: 283; Ropers 
1995: 49 ff.; Beardsley et al 2006: 63; 
Moore 2003; 55 f; Kleinboer 1996: 375). 
Scholars broadly differ between 
two typologies encompassing rather 
passive as well as active mediation 
strategies. While some distinguish 
between the mediator’s role as a 
communicator, a formulator, or a 
manipulator (see Bercovitch/Derouen 
2004: 156; Bercovitch 1992: 17; Tou-
val/Zartman 1985: 11 ff.; Wilkenfeld et 
al. 2003: 283), others differentiate bet-
ween facilitation or reflective behavi-
our, non-directive mediation, or direc-
tive mediation (see Ropers 1995: 49 ff.; 
see also Moore 2003; 55 f.). 
With regard to the latter theory, fa-
cilitation is described as the most pas-
sive method and can be seen as a 
“starting point” for mediation. This 
method focuses for example on gai-
ning the parties’ trust, receiving 
knowledge about the parties as well 
as the issues in dispute, but also on 
fostering mutual empathy and a new 
understanding of the conflict by 
changing perceptions (see Beardsley 
et al 2006: 63; Ropers 1995: 50). Non-
directive mediation aims at leading the 
parties to a mutual acceptable soluti-
on of the conflict, whereby the media-
tor plays a more active role but helps 
on a minimum level (see Kleinboer 
1996: 375; Ropers 1995: 50 f.). In direc-
tive mediation again the mediator 
holds a more activist position by ex-
tending his non-directive role through 
making suggestions and proposals, or 
by exerting pressure to force the par-
ties into an agreement (see Berco-
vitch/Derouen 2004: 157). This me-
thod appears similar to the role of a 
mediator as a manipulator and can 
furthermore be set in context to the 
question of leverage. 
The communicator also plays a ra-
ther passive role as “go-between” by 
channelling information between the 
parties, making contact, or identifying 
issues. The formulator has more 
control over the process and may 
decide about its setting, or he helps 
the parties more actively through his 
creativity to redefine their issues, or to 
find solutions for the conflict (see 
ibid). However, scholars have further 
argued that a mediator should not be 
deadlocked by solely sticking to one 
respective strategy, but rather should 
adapt the most useful method in view 
of possibly changing conflict dyna-
mics (see Touval/Zartmann 1985: 261). 
It appears that the difference in 
strategies used by the mediators in 
Aceh has been a crucial factor for the 
mediation outcome as well. See-
mingly, CMI in contrast to HDC25 
partially used a rather directive stra-
tegy to lead the process, following the 
formula “nothing is agreed until eve-
rything is agreed”, combined with 
playing a formulator role by fostering 
the parties’ creativity. In this regard, 
the comparison of the cases shows an 
apparent further linkage between the 
                                                          
25  HDC’s role - following its low degree of 
leverage and a strategy based on a humanitar-
ian approach (see Huber 2004: viii) - might 
rather be classified as a combination of having 
been a formulator and a communicator. 
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strategy a mediator is able to use and 
the degree of leverage he can provide, 
which relates again to his status, in-
ternational support, expertise – and 
finally to the willingness of the parties 
(see above). This matches with empi-
rical results presented in the literature 
determining that directive mediation 
as an influencing factor improves the 
chances for a successful mediation 
outcome (see Bercovitch/Derouen 
2004: 162). The difficulty arising in 
this context is that due to limited de-
tailed information available particu-
larly on that factor it remains difficult 
to draw any clear conclusion. 
In addition to these factors, a 
further apparent crucial role played 
the changes in leadership of both par-
ties. With regard to the GoI, the com-
parison of the Aceh processes pre-
sents that influencing leaders or 
members of a conflicting party - when 
strongly committed to peace - might 
have the power to undermine, or bet-
ter “control” internal quarrels. This 
way they may create an “artificial 
unity” (see hypothesis 5). Furthermo-
re, it has been argued that also the 
new negotiators on GAM’s side might 
have played a crucial role in relation 
to the successful outcome of this me-
diation. Such factors influencing the 
dynamic nature of a conflict are also 
said in the literature to might be deci-
sive “in determining mediation suc-
cess” (Olson/Pearson 2002: 441). 
The comparison of the cases has 
further made clear that for mediation 
success as defined in this study the 
presence of strong peacekeeping forces 
for guaranteeing the implementation 
of an agreement appears as a most 
crucial factor. HDC’s attempt to take 
over all necessary roles to be played  
in a peace process, from a facilitator to 
a peacekeeper, by establishing the JSC 
has not presented itself as being effec-
tive. As Ahtisaari has stated, the wor-
king field of an NGO ends when tou-
ching the monitoring area (see Aspi-
nall 2005a: 47). While HDC and the 
JSC were unable to control the upco-
ming spoiling activities due to the 
JSC’s weakness and to adequately 
react to violations of the COHA, the 
AMM has been a much stronger mo-
nitoring mechanism of higher political 
authority. 
A last complementary condition 
worth adding are the previous mediati-
on attempts of HDC and their possible 
impact on the outcome of the Aceh II 
case. These have been characterized 
as contributions to the successful me-
diation process of CMI (see Arola 
2005). CMI could build on the lessons 
learned of the previous mediation 
attempts by being able to fall back 
upon the general agenda HDC had 
created as well as on its information 
on possible discussion blocks (see 
Aspinall 2005a: 22). 
In this chapter, the results from 
testing Assefa’s hypotheses on the 
two Aceh mediation processes have 
been reflected in the context of the 
present state of debate in the acade-
mic field with the objective to place 
these within the established theory 
and literature and to identify the 
contribution this study might have to 
offer to the existing field of research 
on the actual potential of track-two 
mediation activities to prevent violen-
ce in intrastate conflicts. Additionally, 
further apparently decisive factors, 
which had not been encompassed by 
Assefa’s hypotheses, have briefly 
been examined. 
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5. Conclusion 
In the following, the comparative 
results from testing Assefa’s hypothe-
ses will again be briefly summarized 
and the usefulness of the method of 
adopting his hypotheses will be dis-
cussed. In this context, the validity of 
this approach as well as difficulties, 
which came up during the empirical 
analysis, will be mentioned. After 
that, more general conclusions will be 
drawn based on the results of the 
empirical analysis. Finally, desiderata 
for future research, which have been 
revealed during the analysis, will be 
outlined. 
5.1 Empirical Results Based on 
Assefa’s Hypotheses 
When talking about Assefa’s theoreti-
cal framework, applying his hypothe-
ses for the comparative analysis of the 
mediation processes in Aceh turned 
out to be useful and relevant. Howe-
ver, a difficulty had been the fact that 
all of Assefa’s hypotheses had been 
formulated in the positive. Following 
this, especially in relation to the nega-
tive Aceh I example, the final conclu-
sion on the influence of some of the 
discussed conditions remains a bit 
indistinct. Nevertheless, the trend 
mainly indicated rather an affirmation 
than a refutation of the hypotheses. 
By testing them on the success case 
Aceh II, the majority of these were 
supported and due to the comparison 
of the two processes, only two condi-
tions were answered in the negative, 
while the influence of the “empow-
erment-condition” on the positive 
mediation outcome remained ques-
tionable. 
As presented in the previous chap-
ter, while being aware of the fact that 
Assefa’s theoretical framework is not 
exhaustive, in particular with regard 
to the large scope of inquiry of such 
conditions discussed in the academic 
field, this approach has been helpful 
as a “starting point” for the purpose 
of this analysis. Nevertheless, Assefa’s 
theoretical framework lacks particu-
larly one key factor strongly influen-
cing the outcome of mediation. That is 
a process variable, related to the me-
diator’s strategy, which is widely 
debated and used as a fourth cluster 
in the topical literature on mediation. 
However, as the analysis and the dis-
cussion of the present state of literatu-
re has shown, Assefa’s hypotheses 
generally remain congruent with the 
key variables still topical and debated 
in the scholarly field. Having tested 
and identified these key factors now 
provides the necessary basis to move 
forward towards further inquiry into 
this topic. 
By comparing the results of the 
Aceh I and Aceh II processes, it has 
been possible to isolate some conditi-
ons, which turned out as apparently 
having been the most crucial ones in 
explaining the different outcomes in 
the Aceh case. Referring to Assefa’s 
conditions first, these resulted from 
all three clusters. In sum, relating to 
the nature and characteristics of the 
conflict, the existence of an at least 
one-sided stalemate accompanied by 
the awareness of high and raising 
costs and GAM’s withdrawal from its 
independence claim belonged to this 
group. Referring to the characteristics 
of the parties, these have been the 
“internal cohesiveness” of the GoI due 
to the creation of some “artificial uni-
ty” as well as the realization of 
weakness and dependence on external 
help following the tsunami ca-
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tastrophe. Finally, with regard to the 
person of the mediator, his or her 
degree of leverage and expertise as well 
as the question of his (im) partiality 
were characterized as most influen-
cing factors. This way, the huge scope 
of conditions covered by Assefa’s 
hypotheses regarded as influential 
ones for a successful mediation could 
be organized in a “ranking list” and 
limited to a smaller number of most 
crucial ones for a deeper insight. 
In addition to those conditions, 
which had been covered by Assefa’s 
hypotheses, certain other factors, such 
as changes in political leaderships, the 
mediator’s strategy, his status and the 
international support the mediator 
receives, or the willingness of the 
parties have been pointed out as ap-
parently further crucial ones. 
As these results solely build on 
one specific conflict with two instan-
ces of mediation and due to the limi-
tation of empirical information avai-
lable26 by exclusively having been 
able to use secondary literature, any 
general deduction to be drawn based 
on these findings remains necessarily 
tentative. The uniqueness of each 
conflict and the changing dynamics of 
its nature as demonstrated by the 
previous analysis limit the scope of 
any such generalization. 
When it comes to answering the 
core research question of this study, 
the comparison of the two Aceh pro-
cesses shows that successful mediati-
on by track-two mediators depends 
on a number of influencing factors 
being interdependent and contingent. 
However, despite the uniqueness of 
each conflict or of situations and dy-
                                                          
26  Contacting CMI to gain further informa-
tion about its involvement in Aceh I was in-
formed that the centre itself has not yet ana-
lysed its role as mediator in the conflict, but 
intends to complete this in the future.  
namics even within the same conflict, 
the Aceh case has illustrated the e-
xistence of indicating factors. These 
have been for example changing lead-
erships, unpredictable occurrences, or 
changes in power relations between 
the parties, which obviously foster the 
chances of successful mediation. 
In addition, the Aceh case proves 
that track-two actors have a potential 
to prevent violence in intrastate 
conflicts, even when intervening on a 
higher political level generally as-
signed to track-one actors. Their 
outstanding advantage is that they 
can cope with the needs of both 
conflicting parties. While a track-two 
intervention in itself may provide the 
insurgents with legitimacy, due to 
these actors’ nongovernmental and 
non-political status it apparently 
neither compromises the respective 
government’s reputation to be able to 
handle its own domestic affairs, nor 
its sovereignty. Especially the latter 
factor seems to increase their attrac-
tiveness as intermediaries in such 
disputes. 
The necessary key component 
seemingly remaining is the question 
of leverage in all its facets – political, 
expertise, and moral - the track-two 
mediator obviously needs to have on 
hand for the mediation to be most 
likely successful. As the Aceh case has 
indicated, it appears that the success 
of a track-two actor’s mediative inter-
vention in an intrastate conflict besi-
des other factors heavily depends on a 
higher degree of leverage he can use. 
The level of leverage seemingly is 
related to his international support, 
which again is strongly connected to 
the mediator’s international reputati-
on and status. Obviously, when inter-
vening on the highest political level in 
such conflicts, the mediator – though 
ideally being track-two personnel not 
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endangering the sovereignty of a state 
– needs to have track-one leverage 
and influence on hand. 
This leads to the conclusion that 
for mediation to be most likely suc-
cessful in intrastate conflicts not only 
interventions on all tracks and society 
levels by different actors have to take 
place. In particular, these apparently 
need to be constructively linked, in 
terms of this study especially between 
the track-one and track-two level. A 
close cooperation between these two 
levels following the Aceh case ap-
pears indispensable. In this regard, 
not only the communication between 
the conflicting parties needs to be 
fostered and supported. In particular, 
also the communication and coopera-
tion between international actors and 
interveners to a conflict needs to be 
further constructively developed gi-
ven the necessary support track-one 
actors can provide in cases when 
track-two personnel appears to be the 
better suited mediator in a respective 
conflict. 
5.2 Future Research 
Following this, future research should 
be focused on such a complementary 
cross track “interactive conflict resolu-
tion approach” (see Mason/Siegfried  
 
2005: 195; Fisher 1997; Olson/Pearson 
2002: 423) and in particular should 
deal with the question of how to best 
link the different tracks. In addition, 
the question of leverage needs to be 
further explored. The communication 
between international actors interven-
ing in such crises needs to be further 
developed in order to achieve the 
most efficient utilization possible of 
personal as well as material resources 
in conflict mitigation and resolution. 
Instead of working alongside each 
other, a closer cooperation between 
these various actors working in diffe-
rent professional fields on all society 
levels apparently needs to be further 
fostered. In this context, the possible 
effectiveness of mediation between 
these various international actors and 
donors to improve the constructive-
ness, communication and use of avai-
lable resources for peace building 
should be examined. In addition, the 
question on the role of individual 
actors, nongovernmental organizati-
ons, or institutions such as the EU to 
play a mediator, or coordinator role 
for achieving improvement in the 
cooperation and coordination of pea-
ce-building efforts between all diffe-
rent intervention levels in conflicting 
zones appears to be of increasing inte-
rest and value. 
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AACC All African Conference of Churches 
AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CMI Crisis Management Initiative 
COHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 
EU European Union 
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) 
GoI Government of Indonesia 
HDC Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (previously, the Henry 
Dunant Centre) 
ICG International Crisis Group 
MP-GAM Majelis Pemerintahan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh 
Movement Government Council) 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
NGO Nongovernmental Organisation 
TNI Tenatara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military) 
UN United Nations 
US United States of America 
WCC World Council of Churches 
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